A significant percentage of urban traffic is caused by the search for parking spots. One possible approach to improve this situation is to guide drivers along routes which are likely to have free parking spots. The task of finding such a route can be modeled as a probabilistic graph problem which is NP-complete. Thus, we propose heuristic approaches for solving this problem and evaluate them experimentally. For this, we use probabilities of finding a parking spot, which are based on publicly available empirical data from TomTom International B.V. Additionally, we propose a heuristic that relies exclusively on conventional road attributes. Our experiments show that this algorithm comes close to the baseline by a factor of 1.3 in our cost measure. Last, we complement our experiments with results from a field study, comparing the success rates of our algorithms against real human drivers.

We consider non-cooperative facility location games where both facilities and clients act strategically and heavily influence each other. This contrasts established game-theoretic facility location models with non-strategic clients that simply select the closest opened facility. In our model, every facility location has a set of attracted clients and each client has a set of shopping locations and a weight that corresponds to its spending capacity. Facility agents selfishly select a location for opening their facility to maximize the attracted total spending capacity, whereas clients strategically decide how to distribute their spending capacity among the opened facilities in their shopping range. We focus on a natural client behavior similar to classical load balancing: our selfish clients aim for a distribution that minimizes their maximum waiting time for getting serviced, where a facility’s waiting time corresponds to its total attracted client weight. We show that subgame perfect equilibria exist and we give almost tight constant bounds on the Price of Anarchy and the Price of Stability, which even hold for a broader class of games with arbitrary client behavior. Since facilities and clients influence each other, it is crucial for the facilities to anticipate the selfish clients’ behavior when selecting their location. For this, we provide an efficient algorithm that also implies an efficient check for equilibrium. Finally, we show that computing a socially optimal facility placement is NP-hard and that this result holds for all feasible client weight distributions.

No abstract