Social Influence, Self-Referent Identity Labels, and Behavior

Abstract

Self-referent identity labels are frequently argued to be a central component of the self and to be important in the planning of conduct. Despite the attractiveness of this argument, relatively little research has yet appeared that supports it, and studies of the Direct all communications to: Dr. Bruce J. Biddle, Center for Research in Social Behavior, University of Missouri-Columbia, Columbia, MO 6521 1.

Injecting social psychology theory into conceptualisations of agricultural agency: Towards a post-productivist farmer self-identity?

“…Identity becomes established when this schema is internalised, i.e. the individual accepts this particular understanding of the world as her/his own and adopts the 'self-referent label' or 'positional label' of the group (Stryker, 1980;Biddle et al, 1985). At the same time, others place the individual as a social object by assessing him/her with the same symbols of identity that s/he appropriates for him/herself (Turner, 1987).…”

The Role of Self‐identity in the Theory of Planned Behavior: A Meta‐Analysis

“…However, identity theorists (e.g., Biddle et al., 1985) have argued that attitudes, norms, and self‐identity have different motivational roots. Individuals conform to attitudes for instrumental reasons and to norms for fear of being rejected by significant others (i.e., external sanctions), whereas one acts in accordance with one's self‐identity for self‐verification reasons.…”

Subject Population, Thought Modality, and Cognitive Dissonance

“…Moreover, several theorists have argued that behavior is motivated by a combination of several modally distinct thought forms. Fishbein and Ajzen (1975;Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977, 1980 argued for a model that combined preferences with attributed norms; Fishbein (1967;also see Kilty, 1978) suggested a model that%ombined preferences, attributed norms, and personal S norms; Triandis (1977) reasoned that behaviors were generated by social, affective, and cognitive thoughts; and Biddle (1979Biddle ( ,1986) advanced a model that combined preferences, norms, and beliefs, particularly beliefs about the self (see Biddle et al, 1985). If we a s s d e that n thought modes capable of generating cognitive dissonance are available Ad that the typical form of cognitive dissonance involves the juxtaposition of two inconsistent thoughts that may or may not share the same modality, then a total of n!…”