2017
DOI: 10.3390/g8010007
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Social Pressure and Environmental Effects on Networks: A Path to Cooperation

Abstract: Abstract:In this paper, we study how the pro-social impact due to the vigilance by other individuals is conditioned by both environmental and evolutionary effects. To this aim, we consider a known model where agents play a Prisoner's Dilemma Game (PDG) among themselves and the pay-off matrix of an individual changes according to the number of neighbors that are "vigilant", i.e., how many neighbors watch out for her behavior. In particular, the temptation to defect decreases linearly with the number of vigilant… Show more

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“…While the evolution of cooperation has been studied at great lengths in biology and sociology [11,12], the problem became attractive for physicists after the discovery of network reciprocity [13], which manifests as the formation of resilient cooperative clusters in a structured population [14][15][16][17][18][19][20][21][22][23][24][25][26][27][28][29][30][31]. Cooperators in the interior of such clusters can survive at conditions that do not sustain cooperation in well-mixed populations.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…While the evolution of cooperation has been studied at great lengths in biology and sociology [11,12], the problem became attractive for physicists after the discovery of network reciprocity [13], which manifests as the formation of resilient cooperative clusters in a structured population [14][15][16][17][18][19][20][21][22][23][24][25][26][27][28][29][30][31]. Cooperators in the interior of such clusters can survive at conditions that do not sustain cooperation in well-mixed populations.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%