Societal Inclusion in Expert Venues: Participation of Interest Groups and Business in the European Commission Expert Groups

Abstract

The elaborate system of expert groups that the European Commission organises is a key feature of EU everyday governance and also a potential channel of societal involvement in EU policy making. This article examines the patterns of participation in the expert group system of a broad set of societal actors-NGOs, social partners/unions, consumer organisations, and business/enterprise. The analysis is based on a large-N study of Commission expert groups. Taking on an "executive politics" perspective, we identify main patterns of participation and analyse organisational factors that affect the inclusion of societal actors in the expert group system. We find that such actors are strongly involved in this system. Yet, there is a striking heterogeneity in the extent to which the Commission's administrative units include societal groups as experts in the policy process. The logics that underpin the inclusion of business organisations are not identical to the logics of inclusion applied to social partners and NGOs. The Commission as the core supranational executive is thus selectively open for societal involvement in its expert groups system, and this bureaucratic openness is patterned, clustered, and conditioned by structural factors that affect how the Commission as a multi-organisation operates.

Stakeholders wanted! Why and how European Union agencies involve non-state stakeholders

“…Indeed, 78 per cent of all EU agencies actively involve non-state stakeholderssuch as firms, industry associations, NGOs or trade unionsvia formal arrangements like advisory committees or public consultations. 1 Following a diverse set of theoretical frameworks, including responsive regulation, regulatory capitalism, horizontal accountability and agency governance, stakeholder involvement is supposed to serve responsive, effective and legitimate regulation (Abbott and Snidal 2013;Ayres and Braithwaite 1992;Bernauer and Gampfer 2013;Coglianese et al 2004;Gornitzka and Sverdrup 2015;Martinez et al 2013;Ottow 2015;Verbruggen 2013). This should be especially acute for EU level agencies, given the combination of a horizontal (delegation of competencies to non-majoritarian institutions) and upward shift of responsibilities (delegation of competencies to supranational governance levels).…”

Public affairs practice and lobbying inequality: Reform and regulation of the influence game

“…Influence is enabled through the provision of information to decision‐makers with business groups able to gain close access to civil servants and legislators by providing expert knowledge (Bouwen, ; Coen & Katsaitis, ). They enjoy a particular advantage through access at the stage of drafting new regulations, with civic groups only invited to input later (Gornitzka & Sverdrup, ). Over a period of time, well‐resourced lobbyists become an essential part of the policymaking process, availing themselves of the opportunities to take advantage of poorly resourced offices of legislators by providing a desperately needed information subsidy.…”

The Expert-Executive Nexus in the EU: An Introduction

“…Member states' government and administrative bodies are coupled to each other and with the Commission in expert groups, but such committees are also important venues through which a range of other external actors accesses the EU policy-making process (Gornitzka & Sverdrup, 2015 (this issue); Holst & Moodie, 2015 (this issue)). As is the case with national governments, advisory committees can be a way to address the dual challenge of securing technical expertise for policy making as well as responding to demands for representation of interests and for accountability (Krick, 2014).…”

“…Some types of information behaviour and contact patterns become institutionalized as "good administrative behaviour" and "infused with meaning" beyond the task of instrumentally seeking expert advice to policy briefs or substantiating mobilizing expert support for controversial proposals (see also Holst & Moodie, 2015 (this issue), on the logic of "institutional decoupling"). Executive bureaucracies can thus develop departmental cultures that are conductive to epistemic orientation in policy making and shape their interaction with external expertise (see also Gornitzka & Sverdrup, 2015 (this issue)). As a result, policy communities can be formed around individual DGs and agencies (Coen, 2007).…”