Solving the second-order free rider problem in a public goods game: An experiment using a leader support system

Ozono, Hiroki; Jin, Nobuhito; Watabe, Motoki; Shimizu, Kazumi

doi:10.1038/srep38349

Cited by 29 publications

(18 citation statements)

References 30 publications

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“…In larger-scale societies, it can be effective to establish systems other than peer reward and punishment. The pool punishment system and/or the leader support system are important candidates for solving the problem [27][28][29][30][31][32] . The limitations of peer reward and punishment emphasize the importance of investigation into how these systems emerge and are maintained.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The role of peer reward and punishment for public goods problems in a localized society

Ozono

Kamijo

Shimizu

2020

Sci Rep

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Cooperation in social dilemmas can be sustained if individuals are effectively rewarded or punished from peers within the group. However, as group size increases, we inevitably face localization, in which a global group is divided into several localized groups. in such societies, members can reward and punish only neighbors within the same localized group, while cooperation for social dilemmas should be solved through global group involvement. in this situation, the global group and the local group are not always equal in terms of welfare, and situations can arise in which cooperation is beneficial for the global group but not for the local group. We predict that in such a locally inefficient situation, peer reward and punishment cannot function to sustain global cooperation. We conducted an experiment in which 16 group members played a public goods game incorporating peer reward and punishment. We manipulated the range of peer reward and punishment (only local members/all global members) and payoff structure (locally efficient/locally inefficient). We found that high cooperation was not achieved and that peer reward and punishment did not function when, and only when, the group was divided into localized groups and the payoff structure was locally inefficient.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The role of peer reward and punishment for public goods problems in a localized society

Ozono

Kamijo

Shimizu

2020

Sci Rep

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“…Recently, Ozono et al . 25 conducted an experiment in which the pool punishment system was governed by a participant and he/she could freely punish group members. The authors found that some governors of the system punished both first- and second-order free riders spontaneously and the group resulted in high cooperation, but other governors punished only nonsupporters and received a certain benefit.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Historically, a punishment system was governed by a specific governor or a few governors of the group, such as headmen in villages, lords of manors, or kings of nations. They could obtain the surplus, and thus, might choose more profitable punishment system for themselves 25 . Therefore, analysis of the surplus has implications for institutional choice by governors.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Punishing second-order free riders before first-order free riders: The effect of pool punishment priority on cooperation

Ozono

Kamijo

Shimizu

2017

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Second-order free riders, who do not owe punishment cost to first-order free riders in public goods games, lead to low cooperation. Previous studies suggest that for stable cooperation, it is critical to have a pool punishment system with second-order punishment, which gathers resources from group members and punishes second-order free riders as well as first-order free riders. In this study, we focus on the priority of punishment. We hypothesize that the pool punishment system that prioritizes second-order punishment is more likely to achieve cooperation than the system that prioritizes first-order punishment, because the former is more likely to obtain sufficient punishment resources. In the experiments, we compare four pool punishment systems: 1To2 (first-order punishment to second-order punishment), 2To1 (second-order punishment to first-order punishment), 1ONLY (first-order punishment only), and 2ONLY (second-order punishment only). We find that the 2To1 and 2ONLY systems can receive more support than the 1To2 and 1ONLY systems and only the 2To1 system can achieve high cooperation. However, the effect of priority of second-order punishment is observed only when the punishment ratio (PR) is low (Experiment 1), not high (Experiment 2), in which the punishment resource is relatively abundant.

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“…In this line, different studies have explored how individuals indeed implement institutions of this type, if offered such possibility. The credible threat of this institution sanctioning opportunistic behavior at the end of the day enhances individual cooperation, which in turn has positive effects on group cooperation [33,34]. This effect is even more pronounced with the option of counter-punishment [35].…”

Section: Pool Punishmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Coordination Concerns: Concealing the Free Rider Problem

Alventosa¹,

Hernández²

2018

Game Theory - Applications in Logistics and Economy

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In our daily routine, we face many situations where we need to coordinate in cooperating, such as maintaining friendships or team working. If we all put all our efforts in doing so, we will efficiently get the best possible outcome for everybody. However, we are occasionally tempted to look the other way and let the rest solve the problem. These situations are called social dilemmas and this passive attitude of not exerting any effort in the common goal and benefitting of others doing so is denominated the free rider problem. The purpose of this chapter is to present this issue by means of a public goods game and propose the different mechanisms experimental literature has demonstrated to conceal the free rider problem. Examples of this nature are maintaining relationships over prolonged periods of time, determining a minimum threshold for the common project rewards to be enjoyed by everybody or enabling transparent communication. Additionally, sanctioning opportunities promote cooperation even further. Besides economic penalizations, punishment can occur at a social domain through hostility, ostracism or bond breaking. Moreover, it can be implemented either from an individual approach or through the use of centralized institutions endowed with sanctioning power.

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Solving the second-order free rider problem in a public goods game: An experiment using a leader support system

Cited by 29 publications

References 30 publications

The role of peer reward and punishment for public goods problems in a localized society

The role of peer reward and punishment for public goods problems in a localized society

Punishing second-order free riders before first-order free riders: The effect of pool punishment priority on cooperation

Coordination Concerns: Concealing the Free Rider Problem

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