Somatosensory evoked potentials during a rubber-hand illusion in schizophrenia

Peled, Alva; Pressman, Assaf; Geva, Amir B.; Modai, Ilan

doi:10.1016/s0920-9964(03)00057-4

Cited by 130 publications

(123 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…113 People on ketamine get the illusion more strongly and they experience it even in a control condition when the real and rubber hands are stroked asynchronously. 113 Patients with schizophrenia 114 and chronic ketamine abusers show the same excessive experience of the illusion in the synchronous and asynchronous conditions.…”

Section: Predictive Coding Of Self and Othermentioning

confidence: 97%

“…116 This paradigm could provide a key test of whether a manipulation in rodents recapitulates psychosis, if mice subject to the putative psychosis model (say ketamine) perceive the illusion in the asynchronous condition. 114 We use our model of our self to make predictions about others. 63 To the extent that we do not share generative models with interlocutors, we will have social problems in reciprocal interactions.…”

Section: Predictive Coding Of Self and Othermentioning

confidence: 99%

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Explaining Delusions: Reducing Uncertainty Through Basic and Computational Neuroscience

Feeney

Groman

Taylor

et al. 2017

Schizophrenia Bulletin

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Delusions, the fixed false beliefs characteristic of psychotic illness, have long defied understanding despite their response to pharmacological treatments (e.g., D 2 receptor antagonists). However, it can be challenging to discern what makes beliefs delusional compared with other unusual or erroneous beliefs. We suggest mapping the putative biology to clinical phenomenology with a cognitive psychology of belief, culminating in a teleological approach to beliefs and brain function supported by animal and computational models. We argue that organisms strive to minimize uncertainty about their future states by forming and maintaining a set of beliefs (about the organism and the world) that are robust, but flexible. If uncertainty is generated endogenously, beliefs begin to depart from consensual reality and can manifest into delusions. Central to this scheme is the notion that formal associative learning theory can provide an explanation for the development and persistence of delusions. Beliefs, in animals and humans, may be associations between representations (e.g., of cause and effect) that are formed by minimizing uncertainty via new learning and attentional allocation. Animal research has equipped us with a deep mechanistic basis of these processes, which is now being applied to delusions. This work offers the exciting possibility of completing revolutions of translation, from the bedside to the bench and back again. The more we learn about animal beliefs, the more we may be able to apply to human beliefs and their aberrations, enabling a deeper mechanistic understanding.Key words: delusions/behavioral neuroscience/cognitive neuroscience/computational psychiatry/associative learning The End of the World and the Beginning of a TheoryIn December 1954, the Chicago Tribune reported that Dorothy Martin was relaying a prophecy from extra-terrestrials that the world was about to end. A number of followers flocked to her but her prophecy did not manifest. She ultimately settled in Sedona, Arizona where she lived until she was 92, continuing to proselytize about aliens but evading interaction with psychiatric services. Did Martin have delusions? What about her acolytes? Defining, explaining, and ultimately understanding delusions has proven challenging (see Freeman and Bebbington, this issue). In this article, we describe how neuroscientists have tried to meet that challenge. The approach demands some simplifying assumptions. Basic neuroscience in preclinical models will not recapitulate all of the features of delusions. However, simple models can be useful.

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Section: Predictive Coding Of Self and Othermentioning

confidence: 97%

Section: Predictive Coding Of Self and Othermentioning

confidence: 99%

Explaining Delusions: Reducing Uncertainty Through Basic and Computational Neuroscience

Feeney

Groman

Taylor

et al. 2017

Schizophrenia Bulletin

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…These electrodes were selected on the basis of the hypothesized location of the overlap between brain activity associated with illusory hand ownership and hand motor imagery (e.g. Kanayama et al, 2009;Munzert et al, 2009) and because somatosensory evoked potentials at electrodes C3 and C4 have been shown to be modulated by illusory ownership (Peled et al, 2003;Press et al, 2008). We note, however, that EEG changes at scalp electrodes C3/C4 may result from neural generators at close and distant locations in the brain (Michel and Murray, 2012).…”

Section: Eeg: Preprocessingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Shared electrophysiology mechanisms of body ownership and motor imagery

Evans

Blanke

2013

NeuroImage

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Although we feel, see, and experience our hands as our own (body or hand ownership), recent research has shown that illusory hand ownership can be induced for fake or virtual hands and may be useful for neuroprosthetics and brain-computer interfaces. Despite the vast amount of behavioral data on illusory hand ownership, neuroimaging studies are rare, in particular electrophysiological studies. Thus, while the neural systems underlying hand ownership are relatively well described, the spectral signatures of body ownership as measured by electroencephalography (EEG) remain elusive. Here we induced illusory hand ownership in an automated, computer-controlled manner using virtual reality while recording 64-channel EEG and found that illusory hand ownership is reflected by a body-specific modulation in the mu-band over fronto-parietal cortex. In a second experiment in the same subjects, we then show that mu as well as beta-band activity in highly similar fronto-parietal regions was also modulated during a motor imagery task often used in paradigms employing non-invasive brain-computer interface technology. These data provide insights into the electrophysiological brain mechanisms of illusory hand ownership and their strongly overlapping mechanisms with motor imagery in fronto-parietal cortex. They also highlight the potential of combining high-resolution EEG with virtual reality setups and automatized stimulation protocols for systematic, reproducible stimulus presentation in cognitive neuroscience, and may inform the design of non-invasive brain-computer interfaces.

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“…The illusion has also been studied in some clinical populations such as schizophrenia (Peled et al, 2003;Peled et al, 2000) and anorexia nervosa (Mussap & Salton, 2006). The present study incorporated a number of these more recent developments, which have relevance for the mentioned aspects of ASD.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Rubber Hand Illusion Reveals Proprioceptive and Sensorimotor Differences in Autism Spectrum Disorders

Paton

Hohwy

Enticott

2011

J Autism Dev Disord

124

101

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Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is characterised by differences in unimodal and multimodal sensory and proprioceptive processing, with complex biases towards local over global processing. Many of these elements are implicated in versions of the rubber hand illusion (RHI), which were therefore studied in high-functioning individuals with ASD and a typically developing control group. Both groups experienced the illusion. A number of differences were found, related to proprioception and sensorimotor processes. The ASD group showed reduced sensitivity to visuotactile-proprioceptive discrepancy but more accurate proprioception. This group also differed on acceleration in subsequent reach trials. Results are discussed in terms of weak top-down integration and precision-accuracy trade-offs. The RHI appears to be a useful tool for investigating multisensory processing in ASD.Keywords: High-functioning autism spectrum disorder, rubber hand illusion, multimodal sensory integration, local processing bias Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Jakob Hohwy, Philosophy Department, Monash University, Building 11, Room w913, Clayton, VIC, 3800, Australia. E-mail: Jakob.Hohwy@monash.edu Running head: THE RUBBER HAND ILLUSION IN AUTISM SPECTRUM DISORDERS AbstractAutism spectrum disorder (ASD) is characterised by differences in unimodal and multimodal sensory

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Somatosensory evoked potentials during a rubber-hand illusion in schizophrenia

Cited by 130 publications

References 8 publications

Explaining Delusions: Reducing Uncertainty Through Basic and Computational Neuroscience

Explaining Delusions: Reducing Uncertainty Through Basic and Computational Neuroscience

Shared electrophysiology mechanisms of body ownership and motor imagery

The Rubber Hand Illusion Reveals Proprioceptive and Sensorimotor Differences in Autism Spectrum Disorders

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