Some New Multi-Protocol Attacks

Abstract

Security protocols are often designed and analyzed in isolation. In the real world, however, more than one protocol may be executed concurrently, possibly with the same keying material. An intruder may therefore be able to manipulate messages from different protocols in order to break the security of an otherwise secure protocol. Attacks involving interactions between different protocols, also referred to as multi-protocol attacks, have appeared less frequently in the literature than attacks involving single protocols. This paper presents multi-protocol attacks on several existing protocols that are believed to be resistant to attacks when used in isolation.

Formal Analysis of Combinations of Secure Protocols

“…weaker agreement: if B thinks that a nonce N A is generated by A, then A has generated N A and B authenticates A (called Aut A in Figure 3 and 4) Figure 3 summarizes results that we obtain with Tamarin in isolation on protocols from [22], and Figure 4 summarizes results we obtain for the multiprotocols. As previously, ni-synch stands for non-injective synchronization, sec stands for secrecy and ni-agree stands for non-injective agreement.…”

“…We try to find the attacks described in [22] using Tamarin, to see if we find the same or different attacks if we use an automatic tool. The properties verified are not clearly defined in [22], so we keep the properties as defined previously. More precisely, we verified different authentication properties: non-injective synchronization, non-injective agreement, and a weaker agreement property.…”

“…-We automatically find all the manual attacks described in [22]. Moreover, we find novel different attacks on the same properties, or unknown attacks on different properties.…”

“…In [22], Mathuria, Raj Singh, Venkata Sharavan, and Kirtankar found six multi-protocol attacks based on 13 protocols from literature: Denning-Sacco protocol [13], amended Woo-Lam protocol [5], ISO Five-Pass protocol [7], Abadi-Needham protocol [1], six protocols from Perrig and Song using APG [26], and three protocols from Zhou and Foley using ASPB [30]. In contrast to these works, we use an automatic verification tool to find these attacks.…”

“…Outline: The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we present the results we obtain and we compare them with those obtained manually in [22] or using Scyther [9]. Then, Section 3 discusses our workflow in Tamarin, and finally the last section concludes the paper.…”