Some Reflections on the Governance Framework of the Single Resolution Board

Abstract

First embodied by the European Supervisory Authorities in 2010, agency governance in the financial sector has gained momentum with the creation of the Single Resolution Board (SRB) – an EU agency with considerable competencies in banking prudential policy. Within a short period, backed by the ‘ESMA‐Short Selling case’ judgment, agencies have progressed from supporting the European Commission with their quasi‐rule making, to a more prominent role in the decision‐making process, potentially influencing policy‐makers' agenda. By engaging in a qualitative analysis of legal documents, official texts and relevant scholarship, this research note examines the formal framework and practical aspects of SRB's governance, in order to substantiate whether its establishment presents a ‘qualitative increase’ in financial sector agencification. At the same time, the research note highlights problematic issues arising because of the limitations set by the Meroni doctrine arguing that the Board's wide powers ‘on paper’ may prove challenging to implement in practice.

Multilevel cooperation in the EU resolution of cross-border bank groups: lessons from the non-euro area Member States joining the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM)

“…Few Member States had authorities with a specific crisis management mandate before the BRRD and there is no dominant model which has been adopted, with Member States-both euro and not-equally split between central banks and independent agencies acting as the NRAs. 6 Within the EBU (i.e. including the non-euro Croatia and Bulgaria), there are 10 NRAs which are specialised (i.e.…”

“…Art. 41(1) SRM states that: "The Board shall be a Union agency with a specific structure corresponding to its tasks" 6. See list of resolution authorities published online by the EBA pursuant to Art.…”