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First embodied by the European Supervisory Authorities in 2010, agency governance in the financial sector has gained momentum with the creation of the Single Resolution Board (SRB) – an EU agency with considerable competencies in banking prudential policy. Within a short period, backed by the ‘ESMA‐Short Selling case’ judgment, agencies have progressed from supporting the European Commission with their quasi‐rule making, to a more prominent role in the decision‐making process, potentially influencing policy‐makers' agenda. By engaging in a qualitative analysis of legal documents, official texts and relevant scholarship, this research note examines the formal framework and practical aspects of SRB's governance, in order to substantiate whether its establishment presents a ‘qualitative increase’ in financial sector agencification. At the same time, the research note highlights problematic issues arising because of the limitations set by the Meroni doctrine arguing that the Board's wide powers ‘on paper’ may prove challenging to implement in practice.

No abstract

Ever since the outset of the financial crisis of 2009, agencies have emerged as key actors of European Union (EU) financial sector governance. As an organisational form that can be insulated from national political pressures, and committed to the Union interest, agencies proliferated in the financial sector ushering the agencification trend in finance. In this sense, the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) -as part of the European Supervisory Authorities -practically embodies this trend. ESMA presents a radical shift in financial markets' governance due to the nature of its soft law regulations and the direct impact it exerts on addressees' behaviour in emergency circumstances. But ESMA's success in optimising financial sector governance largely depends on its legitimacy, which is centred on independence. At the same time independence demands wider participation and inclusiveness of the decision-making process. This is not easy to achieve in a complex system with multiple stakeholders as is the governance of the EU financial sector (e.g., EU institutions, national actors, private sector). This paper examines ESMA's interinstitutional relations and independence in light of publicly voiced criticism. We find that ESMA's main executive bodies are still susceptible to influences by Member States as well as EU institutions (i.e., Commission), which undermines its operational independence.

Jedan od ciljeva Bankovne unije jest i razvoj zajedničke supervizorske kulture, odnosno harmonizacija supervizijskih praksi, standarda i metodologija država članica koje sudjeluju u ovom integracijskom okviru. I dok regulatorna i proceduralna dosljednost ovisi o prudencijalnim propisima, zajednička kultura nadzora prije svega ovisi o kvalitetnoj suradnji između nacionalnih supervizora. Ova suradnja događa se unutar zajedničkih nadzornih timova, glavnih operativnih sastavnica Jedinstvenog nadzornog mehanizma koji kontinuirano nadziru sistemski značajne banke, na temelju zajedničkih supervizijskih standarda i metodologije, pri tome kombinirajući europsku i lokalnu prudencijalnu stručnost u praksi. Polazeći od interdisciplinarnog teorijskog okvira (političke) ekonomije, s posebnim naglaskom na problem principal-agent kao i pitanje (de)centralizacije odlučivanja u upravljanju unutar Ekonomske i monetarne unije, rad koristi kvalitativnu analizu brojnih primarnih i sekundarnih izvora, dajući po prvi puta u domaćoj literaturi, iscrpnu analizu zajedničkih nadzornih timova, (uključujući onih koji djeluju u okviru bliske suradnje), ukazujući na važnost višerazinske suradnje te otkrivajući participativnu, a ne centralizirajuću, prirodu Jedinstvenog nadzornog mehanizma. Rad zaključuje kako su kako su zajednički nadzorni timovi izvršna ruka holističkog, sveobuhvatnog procesa provjere boniteta banke i dubinskog mikroprudencijalnog nadzora unutar Jedinstevnog nadzornog mehanizma ključni za kreaciju i konsolidaciju zajedničke nadzorne kulture u Bankovnoj uniji.