Sovereignty as irresponsibility? A Realist critique of the Responsibility to Protect

Abstract

This article aims to cast a critical light on

Lessons Learned from Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in Libya

“…Historically, the increasing intervention on other states' problems will strengthen international human rights norms, enhance humanitarian intervention, and increase the impact on human security issues. Because it will imply that state authorities are responsible for the functions of protecting the safety and lives of citizens to the international community therefore it means that state are responsible for their action (Moses 2013).…”

Assessing the Responsibility to Protect’s motivational capacity: The role of humanity

“…In this sense, the ability of the R2P to successfully build agreement for action in mass atrocity crime situations is one that must be understood exclusively in the realm of the political, by which the normative concept of humanity functions solely to legitimate political motivation rather than grounding a moral goal to be put into practice. Motivation for carrying out action is thus fundamentally understood through the interests of powerful states ‘who are themselves not subject to the “universal” ethic of responsibility’ (Moses, 2013: 133). Consequently, a belief in the underlying dominance of power politics in relation to the R2P has continued to be a point of controversy, with questions over the extent to which it has allowed states to dress up the language of protection and humanity in order to implement strategies in support of their own interests (Hurd, 2012).…”

Liberal Warfare: A Crusade Twice Removed

“…Contrary to liberals' metaphysical faith in the “emergence” of a global human rights regime, the historical evidence can just as easily be interpreted as pointing in the opposite direction. Realists, for example, argue that the “global legalism” envisioned by liberals is an illusion since international law depends on powerful states to enforce it but that states are locked in incessant rivalry and competition (Bobbitt ; Moses ). The fact that the United States, China, India, and all Middle Eastern states apart from Jordan refuse to join the International Criminal Court; the presence of notorious human‐rights‐abusing states on the UN Commission on Human Rights (which had to be reinvented as the UN Human Rights Council) and the passing of the presidency of the Council of Europe to Serbia when it had still not handed over Ratko Mladic; widespread criticism of the various “truth commissions” and International Criminal Tribunals in places like South Africa, the former Yugoslavia, Sierra Leone, and Rwanda for producing lengthy, over‐expensive trials that fail to deliver justice; and the West's failure to “put its money where its mouth is” in order to rectify such problems—all undermine the idea of a universal regime emerging to prevent human rights abuses.…”

“…Realists object that sovereignty cannot simply be “redefined” so as to make it contingent upon “responsible” behavior. As well as having a normative or de jure aspect (pertaining to its treatment in international law), it also, de facto, reflects coercive power as an empirical quality: It is inherently irresponsible insofar as it signifies potential for “action that cannot be susceptible to interference or accountability by another power” (Moses :115–116). Although the champions of R2P regard the UN as “the only credible international institution we have, or are ever likely to have, with the necessary combination of legitimacy and authority” to sanction humanitarian interventions (Evans :180), in Realist eyes this in fact means the Security Council, a body of five sovereign states whose “irresponsibility” comes into view when they fail to reach agreement over an intervention.…”

“…The “society of states” is in fact unlike domestic society, because there is no overarching authority to enforce the law impartially; only strong states have the power to do so. In which case, “the strong have no responsibilities, except to police the weak”; R2P “removes the ‘sovereign immunity’ only of weaker states and not of the powerful” (Cunliffe :54; Moses :134). There can be no universal standard or legal regime, since powerful states are not obliged to obey; assuming as much only obscures the decisive and fundamental power relations upon which decisions about intervention can and should be made.…”