Spatio-Temporal Coincidence and the Grounding Problem

Bennett, Karen

doi:10.1023/b:phil.0000026471.20355.54

Cited by 227 publications

(117 citation statements)

References 34 publications

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“…26 For non-hylomorphic accounts of grounding modality see Bealer (2002), Camerone (2012), Elder (2004), Ellis (2009), Forbes (1985, Gibbard (1975), Goswick (2010), Hale (2002), Humberstone (1991), Hupakka, Keinanen, and Korhonen (1999), Kripke (1972), Paul (2004), Quine (1966), andSider (2003). 27 The hylomorphist rejects Bennett's (2004) gloss of the difference between (i) the sort being more fundamental and the modal properties being derived from it and (ii) the modal properties being more fundamental and the sort being derived from them. The hylomorphist takes this distinction to be crucial.…”

Section: Hylomorphism Response-dependence and Grounding Modalitymentioning

confidence: 99%

The Hard Question for Hylomorphism

Goswick

2018

Metaphysics

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The view that ordinary objects are composites of form and matter ("hylomorphism") can be contrasted with the more common view that ordinary objects are composed of only material parts ("matter only"). On a matter-only view the hard question is modal: which modal profile does that (statue-shaped) object have? Does it have the modal profile of a statue, a lump, a mere aggregate? On a hylomorphic view the hard question is ontological: which objects exist? Does a statue (matter-m + statue-form), a lump (matter-m + lump-form), and/or a mere aggregate (matter-m + mere aggregate-form) exist? I defend a novel answer to the hard question for hylomorphism. In particular, I argue that which ordinary objects exist depends, in part, on how subjects respond to the matter they encounter. I argue that, with regard to grounding the existence and modal properties of ordinary objects, response-dependent hylomorphism is superior to both matter only views and to non-response-dependent versions of hylomorphism.

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Section: Hylomorphism Response-dependence and Grounding Modalitymentioning

confidence: 99%

The Hard Question for Hylomorphism

Goswick

2018

Metaphysics

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“…It survives some changes, in the frequency and regularity of the 12 See e.g. Sider (2013) for the nihilist extreme and Bennett (2004) for the 'plenitudinous' extreme. All parties to the debate that I am considering here believe something in between.…”

Section: § 2 Exclusivity V Colocationmentioning

confidence: 99%

II-Exclusive Individuals

Brewer

2015

Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume

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I agree with a great deal in Helen Steward's paper (2015). I am especially sympathetic to her suggestion that we gain metaphysical illumination by considering various ways in which we arrive at ideas of certain kinds of individuals by abstraction from those of more basic kinds. My aim is to pursue that suggestion by exploring the proposal that a grounding node in this form of abstraction may be characterized by Exclusivity in spatial location. Steward claims that we arrive at our ideas of specific events and processes by different modes of abstraction in cases where a more basic persisting individual undergoes some kind of change. I argue that the most basic individuals in this hierarchy of abstraction are enduring substances that occupy their spatial location exclusively at all times: no two such substances are ever precisely collocated.

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“…Others reject coinciding entities on the basis of the grounding problem (Bennett 2004). If coinciding objects x and y are not identical, presumably they differ with respect to certain properties -modal or historical ones, for example.…”

Section: A Problem For the Many-slice Constitution View And The Path mentioning

confidence: 99%

Building Enduring Objects Out of Spacetime

Gilmore

2014

Synthese Library

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, eds., Mereology and the Sciences (volume under review at Springer, Synthese Library) Cody Gilmore Endurantism, the view that material objects are wholly present at each moment of their careers, is under threat from supersubstantivalism, the view that material objects are identical to spacetime regions. I discuss three compromise positions. They are alike in that they all take material objects to be composed of spacetime points or regions without being identical to any such point or region. They differ in whether they permit multilocation and in whether they generate cases of mereologically coincident entities. IntroductionLet me start with a rough characterization of two main views about persistence:Endurantism: At least some material objects persist through time; and every material object is temporally unextended and wholly present at each instant at which it exists at all. Moreover, it is not the case that every material object has a different instantaneous temporal part 1 at each different instant at which it exists.Perdurantism: At least some material objects persist through time; any every material object has a different instantaneous temporal part at each different instant at which it exists. Material objects that do persist are temporally extended and are at most partially present (not wholly present) at any one instant.I will introduce more carefully formulated views later on (from Gilmore 2006), but these are adequate for present purposes. Endurantism fits comfortably with presentism and certain other A-theorist of time.2 It also fits together fairly well with a certain brand of B-theoretic eternalism. What I have in mind here is a view like Newton's, according to which substantival space and substantival time are two separate and fundamental entities, and spacetime, if there is such a thing at all, is merely a construct of some sort. (Perhaps spacetime points are identified with ordered pairs.) Call this view about space and time 'separatist substantivalism'; it should be understood as incorporating eternalism and the B-theory. 1 The standard definition of 'instantaneous temporal part' runs as follows: 'x is an instantaneous temporal part of y at t' means '(i) t is an instant, (ii) x is a part of y at t, (iii) x overlaps-at-t every part-at-t of y, (iii) x is present at t, and (iv) x is not present at any other instant'. (This is based on Sider (2001: 59).) For other definitions, see Gibson and Pooley (2006: 163), Parsons (2007), and Balashov (2010: 73). The key point is that, in order for a thing y to count as a temporal part of a thing x, y must be a part of x and y must be spatially co-located with x at any moment at which y is present. 2 A-theories of time all say that there is a time that is present in some absolute, not-merely-indexical sense. That is, they say that there is a 'metaphysically privileged' present time. The B-theory of time denies this. Presentism is an A-theory of time according to which there are no non-present entities (such as, presumably, p...

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Spatio-Temporal Coincidence and the Grounding Problem

Cited by 227 publications

References 34 publications

The Hard Question for Hylomorphism

The Hard Question for Hylomorphism

II-Exclusive Individuals

Building Enduring Objects Out of Spacetime

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