Specialness and Egalitarianism

Merlo, Giovanni

doi:10.1002/tht3.75

Cited by 11 publications

(6 citation statements)

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“…15,16 We now come to the second issue introduced above, concerning the relationship between the facts that constitute reality and the facts that obtain simpliciter. Merlo (2013Merlo ( , 2023 has argued that the fragmentalist's basic metaphysical commitments, if taken together with a factive conception of reality, give rise to what he calls "tensed belief explosion" -many more tensed beliefs than we could reasonably embrace at one time, such as the incompatible beliefs that Socrates is alive and that Socrates is dead. He therefore suggests that the fragmentalist embrace a non-factive conception of reality, on which it is not the case that all facts that obtain in reality obtain simpliciter.…”

Section: Solomyakmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…14 This follows trivially from Lipman's understanding of incompatibility as the impossibility of co-obtainment.15 By 'fragmentation of reality' here I just mean the structure these views attribute to reality by distinguishing between, e.g., obtainment and co-obtainment, or constitution and obtainment-in-a-fragment, as well as via their distinctive rules of logical inference. These pictures constitute ways of understanding reality as fragmented.16 SeeSimon (2018) for a further classification of fragmentalist views based on the kind of incompatibility or contradiction they allow in reality.17 Merlo's (2013Merlo's ( , 2023 own view is one that does not respect Neutrality on the level of obtainment-simpliciter: the…”

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“…17 17 Merlo's (2013, 2023) own view is one that does not respect Neutrality on the level of obtainment‐simpliciter: the perspective one occupies is privileged as being the perspective whose facts obtain . …”

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How to be a perspectival pluralist

Solomyak

2024

Philosophy Compass

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The temporal, first‐personal, and modal domains in metaphysics involve a range of perspectives on reality: the perspective of the present as opposed to those of other times, the perspective of one's own self as opposed to those of other subjects, and the perspective of the actual world as opposed to those of other possible worlds. In each case, we can ask about the metaphysical standing of these various perspectives with respect to one another: Is one perspective privileged above the rest? There is a tension at the heart of our intuitive conception of the phenomena in these domains, motivating (at least in some of these cases) a pluralist conception of reality — a stance which attempts to take seriously the absoluteness of the present‐tensed, first‐personal, or actual‐worldly facts, while also embracing the equal standing in reality of all perspectives of the relevant kind. My purpose in this paper is, first, to present an overview of recently popular forms of pluralism — or, what Fine (2005) calls non‐standard realism — with a particular focus on fragmentalism. I'll then raise a worry for fragmentalist views, and finally, present an alternative form of pluralism about the perspectival. We'll see that, while in some ways more radical, the alternative form of pluralism I present has some conceptual advantages over more familiar non‐standard realist views, and — more generally — can help illuminate the space of possible pluralist views about the perspectival.

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How to be a perspectival pluralist

Solomyak

2024

Philosophy Compass

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“…46 46 One worry about these kinds of proposals is that it is not clear if they do justice to the main motivations behind First‐Person Realism, which require that I am special simpliciter (not merely relative to a world or fragment). For further discussion, see Merlo (2013). …”

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Eight Arguments for First‐Person Realism

Builes

2023

Philosophy Compass

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“…Alternatively, one might accept cross‐temporal grounding relations (as in Merlo, ). We will not consider this option here.…”

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Flow Fragmentalism

Torrengo

Iaquinto

2019

Theoria

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In this article, we articulate a version of non‐standard A‐theory – which we call Flow Fragmentalism – in relation to its take on the issue of supervenience of truth on being. According to the Truth Supervenes on Being (TSB) Principle, the truth of past‐ and future‐tensed propositions supervenes, respectively, on past and future facts. Since the standard presentist denies the existence of past and future entities and facts concerning them that do not obtain in the present, she seems to lack the resources to accept both past and future‐tensed truths and the TSB Principle. Contrariwise, positions in the philosophy of time that accept an eternalist ontology (e.g., B‐theory, moving spotlight, and Fine's and Lipman's versions of fragmentalism) allow for a “direct” supervenience base for past‐ and future‐tensed truths. We argue that Flow Fragmentalism constitutes a middle ground, which retains most of the advantages of both views, and allows us to articulate a novel account of the passage of time.

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Specialness and Egalitarianism

Cited by 11 publications

References 10 publications

How to be a perspectival pluralist

How to be a perspectival pluralist

Eight Arguments for First‐Person Realism

Flow Fragmentalism

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