This paper defends the view that one's own mental states are metaphysically privileged vis‐à‐vis the mental states of others, even if only subjectively so. This is an instance of a more general view called Subjectivism, according to which reality is only subjectively the way it is. After characterizing Subjectivism in analogy to two relatively familiar views in the metaphysics of modality and time, I compare the Subjectivist View of the Mental with Egocentric Presentism, a version of Subjectivism recently advocated by Caspar Hare. I argue that the Subjectivist View of the Mental goes a considerable way towards solving (or dissolving) certain long‐standing philosophical puzzles having to do with the unity of consciousness, the contents of self‐awareness and the intransmissibility of experiential knowledge through testimony.

This paper argues that what is currently the most popular version of temporal Fragmentalism—‘unstructured’ temporal Fragmentalism, as I shall call it—faces a problem of Tensed Belief Explosion. Four possible solutions to this problem are reviewed and shown to be wanting; two more promising ones risk fostering scepticism about the existence of tensed facts—hence, about Fragmentalism itself. The tentative moral is that unstructured versions of Fragmentalism are at best unmotivated and at worst seriously flawed.

There are two intuitions about time. The first is that there's something special about the present that objectively differentiates it from the past and the future. Call this intuition Specialness. The second is that the time at which we happen to live is just one among many other times, all of which are 'on a par' when it comes to their forming part of reality. Call this other intuition Egalitarianism. Tradition has it that the so-called 'A-theories of time' fare well at addressing the first intuition, but rather badly when it comes to the second. The goal of this article is to offer advice to A-theorists about how to reconcile their view with Egalitarianism.

Many philosophers have been attracted to the idea of using the logical form of a true sentence as a guide to the metaphysical grounds of the fact stated by that sentence. This paper looks at a particular instance of that idea: the widely accepted principle that disjunctions are grounded in their true disjuncts. I will argue that an unrestricted version of this principle has several problematic consequences and that it's not obvious how the principle might be restricted in order to avoid them. My suggestion is that, instead of trying to restrict the principle, we should distinguish between metaphysical and conceptual grounds and take the principle to apply exclusively to the latter. This suggestion, if correct, carries over to other prominent attempts at using logical form as a guide to ground.

It has been observed that, unlike other kinds of singular judgments, mental self-ascriptions are immune to error through misidentification: they may go wrong, but not as a result of mistaking someone else's mental states for one's own. Although recent years have witnessed increasing interest in this phenomenon, three basic questions about it remain without a satisfactory answer: what is exactly an error through misidentification? What does immunity to such errors consist in?And what does it take to explain the fact that mental self-ascriptions exhibit this sort of immunity?The aim of this paper is to bring these questions into focus, propose some tentative answers and use them to show that one prominent attempt to explain the immunity to error through misidentification of mental self-ascriptions is unsuccessful.When one forms a judgment, there are various kinds of errors one can make. One may judge that someone is crossing the street when, in reality, nobody is crossing the street. One may judge that the person crossing the street is wearing blue trousers, when, in reality, the person crossing the street is wearing black trousers. Or one may judge that Paul McCartney is crossing the street, when, in reality, someone is crossing the street, but it is not Paul McCartney. Errors of the last sortwhereby one mistakes someone for someone else -are often referred to as cases of error through misidentification.It was Wittgenstein who first pointed out, in a famous passage of the Blue Book, that in the case of mental self-ascriptions "no error [through misidentification] is possible" (Wittgenstein 1958, 67.). For example, "there is no question of recognizing a person when I say that I have a toothache" and so it is "impossible that in making the statement 'I have a toothache' I should have mistaken