Spectrum Leasing to Cooperating Secondary Ad Hoc Networks

Simeone, Osvaldo; Stanojev, Igor; Savazzi, Stefano; Bar-Ness, Y.; Spagnolini, Umberto; Pickholtz, R.L.

doi:10.1109/jsac.2008.080118

Cited by 536 publications

(432 citation statements)

References 17 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

425

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…IV-C.1) also increases, providing it with an opportunity of exploiting large channel |h RS,k | for transmission. We note that the similar behavior was also observed in [8].…”

Section: ) Calculation Of P (N)supporting

confidence: 86%

“…This enables on-the-air decisions and avoids the regulatory issues or money transactions that commonly hinder the implementation of the spectrum leasing concept. The idea of spectrum leasing via cooperation was originally proposed in [8]. The solution therein requires a centralized decision process at the primary node based on global system information.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The solution therein requires a centralized decision process at the primary node based on global system information. The proposal in this current work can be seen as a further elaboration on the ideas of [8] to offer a fully distributed solutions by exploiting cooperative ARQ and auction theory.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

An Auction-Based Incentive Mechanism for Non-Altruistic Cooperative ARQ via Spectrum-Leasing

Stanojev

Simeone

Spagnolini

et al. 2009

GLOBECOM 2009 - 2009 IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract-We propose and analyze a novel decentralized mechanism that motivates otherwise non-cooperative stations to participate as relays in cooperative ARQ protocol. Cooperation incentive is provided by the possibility for the source to lease a portion of retransmission slot for the traffic of relaying terminals. To further leverage the opportunistic nature of cooperative ARQ and obtain a fully decentralized solution, the (motivated) relaying nodes compete for access to the retransmission slot by trying to make the best retransmission offer. Effective arbitration of cooperative retransmissions is performed using auction theory (bidding), with the source in the role of the auctioneer, the relaying nodes acting as the bidders and the (use of the) retransmission slot as the bidding article. It is noted that the proposed solution can be seen as a practical framework for the implementation of cognitive radio networks running according to the property-rights model (spectrum leasing). Numerical results and analysis confirm the efficient dynamic resource allocation property of the proposed scheme, revealing the relevant gains in terms of expected number of (re)transmissions required for successful data delivery for both the source (primary) and the cooperating (secondary) nodes.

show abstract

“…IV-C.1) also increases, providing it with an opportunity of exploiting large channel |h RS,k | for transmission. We note that the similar behavior was also observed in [8].…”

Section: ) Calculation Of P (N)supporting

confidence: 86%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

An Auction-Based Incentive Mechanism for Non-Altruistic Cooperative ARQ via Spectrum-Leasing

Stanojev

Simeone

Spagnolini

et al. 2009

GLOBECOM 2009 - 2009 IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…However, the SUs payments were not the actual material compensation and their cooperative powers were set to be fixed. In [16,17], the PU s transmission rate was maximized based on game theory. With a signal-to-noise rate (SNR) constraint, a distributed power control algorithm was proposed to allow all SUs to access the channel at the same time.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Stackelberg Game for Spectrum Leasing in Cooperative Cognitive Radio Networks

Wang

Guan

Han

et al. 2013

Int. J. Autom. Comput.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

According to the property-rights model of cognitive radio, primary users (PUs) who own the spectrum resource have the right to lease part of spectrum to secondary users (SUs) in exchange for appropriate profit. In this paper, we propose a pricing-based spectrum leasing framework between one PU and multiple SUs. In this scenario, the PU attempts to maximize its utility by setting the price of spectrum. Then, the selected SUs have the right to decide their power levels to help PU s transmission, aiming to obtain corresponding access time. The spectrum leasing problem can be cast into a stackelberg game, where the PU plays the seller-level game and the selected SUs play the buyer-level game. Through analysis based on the backward induction, we prove that there exists a unique equilibrium in the stackelberg game with certain constraints. Numerical results show that the proposed pricing-based spectrum leasing framework is effective, and the performance of both PU and SUs is improved, compared to the traditional mechanism without cooperation.

show abstract

“…Besides information theory, game theory is also a widely used analytical tool to characterize the cooperative/non-cooperative behavior of secondary users in dynamic environments (e.g., [18]). See [19] for a nice review of the field.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Throughput and Delay Bounds for Cognitive Transmissions

Borgonovo

Cesana

Fratta

Advances in Ad Hoc Networking

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Cognitive networks are based on agile and opportunistic use of spectrum resources. This work focuses on those network scenarios where primary or licensed users coexist with secondary or unlicensed ones. Secondary users opportunistically access the shared resources whenever vacant, with the strict constraint of being invisible to primary users. We derive here analytical bounds on throughput and transmission delay of secondary users under different assumptions on secondary and primary users traffic statistics, and we comment on the use of the proposed models to dimension secondary transmissions.

show abstract

Spectrum Leasing to Cooperating Secondary Ad Hoc Networks

Cited by 536 publications

References 17 publications

An Auction-Based Incentive Mechanism for Non-Altruistic Cooperative ARQ via Spectrum-Leasing

An Auction-Based Incentive Mechanism for Non-Altruistic Cooperative ARQ via Spectrum-Leasing

A Stackelberg Game for Spectrum Leasing in Cooperative Cognitive Radio Networks

Throughput and Delay Bounds for Cognitive Transmissions

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About