This paper proposes a detailed Aerospace Expeditionary Force (AEF) plan, including individual squadron alignment and concept of operations that uses the current force structure and disposition, and will allow the Expeditionary Aerospace Force (EAF) "vision" to become a reality now. This topic was chosen primarily for one reason: the current operations tempo (OPSTEMPO) throughout the U.S. Air Force is driving the retention rate so low that it threatens the finely tuned, decisive combat capability crafted so masterfully over the last 10 -20 years. A fully implemented EAF "vision" will not only meet and exceed any military requirements foreseen over the next 10 years, but it has the potential to dramatically reduce our OPSTEMPO.Reducing the OPSTEMPO should directly affect retention rates. While AEF operations began in October 1999, full implementation of the EAF "vision" is not predicted to occur for another four to five years. This is simply too long to wait.There are four main parts to this proposal. The first part contains a quick review of the background leading up to the transition to the EAF. The second part consolidates several sources to describe and outline the full EAF "vision." This part of the paper compares the "vision" to the reality of on-going operations today. Furthermore, this part analyzes who must be convinced that the "vision" is the right way to go and how it can be accomplished. The third part of the paper contains the proposed plan itself. The plan includes all assumptions and planning factors used, a list of squadron-by-squadron tasking, a detailed concept of operations for each segment of the plan, and an in-depth analysis of each AEF segment's capabilities and restrictions.Finally, the fourth part of the paper analyzes what the net result implementation of the "vision" will have on OPSTEMPO.In development of the plan, numerous compromises and agreements are proposed within the Total Force, e.g., active duty, Air National Guard (ANG), and Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC). These planning factors and assumptions must be the foundation of any AEF plan. If all ANG and AFRC squadrons are tasked to sit on a 12 or 24 hour "on call" alert all the time then it would be unrealistic to think these reserve forces could continue to operate in their current mix of part-time and full-time personnel. If all "on call" forces are put on a 72+ hour alert then actual combat employment timing is more than likely stretched to the point of unacceptability to the regional Commander-in-Chiefs (CINCs). To allow part of the forces to have short duration "on call" alert periods and other forces longer "on call" alert periods would be akin to piecemealing xii combat power into the fight when it is needed the most. The bottom line is that compromises and agreements must be made within the Total Force if the EAF vision is ever going to become a reality. This paper has proposed several "planning factors" that are the basis for these compromises and agreements. Some of the key planning factors in the proposal concern "on c...