Spontaneous and deliberate future thinking: a dual process account

Abstract

In this article, we address an apparent paradox in the literature on mental time travel and mind-wandering: How is it possible that future thinking is both constructive, yet often experienced as occurring spontaneously? We identify and describe two 'routes' whereby episodic future thoughts are brought to consciousness, with each of the 'routes' being associated with separable cognitive processes and functions. Voluntary future thinking relies on controlled, deliberate and slow cognitive processing. The other, termed involuntary or spontaneous future thinking, relies on automatic processes that allows 'fullyfledged' episodic future thoughts to freely come to mind, often triggered by internal or external cues. To unravel the paradox, we propose that the majority of spontaneous future thoughts are 'pre-made' (i.e., each spontaneous future thought is a reiteration of a previously constructed future event), and therefore based on simple, well-understood, memory processes. We also propose that the pre-made hypothesis explains why spontaneous future thoughts occur rapidly, are similar to involuntary memories, and predominantly about upcoming tasks and goals. We also raise the possibility that spontaneous future thinking is the default mode of imagining the future. This dual process approach complements and extends standard theoretical approaches that emphasise constructive simulation, and outlines novel opportunities for researchers examining voluntary and spontaneous forms of future thinking.

The effects of aging and an episodic specificity induction on spontaneous task-unrelated thought

“…In fact, previous research supports the view that spontaneous future thoughts are “prestored representations of previously imagined events” ([ 40 ], p. 269). More recently, the evidence for this idea has been reviewed and developed in the dual process account of future thinking, which suggests that the majority of spontaneous future thoughts are pre-made and result from the activation of representations of previously constructed events [ 53 ].…”

“…Alternatively, spontaneous thoughts might rely more on direct retrieval processes that imply the existence of pre-stored event representations, independent of event construction [ 39 ]. Supporting this idea, spontaneous future thoughts are characterized by relatively short reaction times ([ 40 , 53 ], for a review). According to this perspective, the ESI should not affect spontaneous thoughts.…”

Cognition in Situations

“…This section marries two cognitive processes to representations of the past and the future. I argue that analyzing collective and individual representations of the past and the future allows social scientists to operationalize cognition in naturally occurring social situations because the past and the future require some cognitive effort to reconstruct and anticipate, respectively (Barsalou 2008; Cole and Kvavilashvili 2019; Mead 1959:xxvi). To carve a path forward for situational analyses of cognition, I build off of recent theoretical and empirical contributions to sociology that take anticipated futures seriously (Gibson 2011; Lee 2016; Mische 2009, 2014; Tavory 2016, 2018; Tavory and Eliasoph 2013) and advance new methodological strategies of operationalizing cognition at the microlevel.…”

“…The point that the past and the future figure into automatic cognitive processes fits neatly within the typical understanding of cognition that is apparent in the sociology of cognition. The past is where our habits are formed—knowingly or not—and where we learned the typical ways that events are sequenced—lessons which then become ingrained into our associational memory (Bourdieu 1990:60; Cole and Kvavilashvili 2019; Dewey 1922). Such understandings and associations are typically nondeclarative and play out in nonproblematic situations where all members have a sense about how events will unfold over time.…”

“…Making projections about the future demands cognitive effort. In contrast to spontaneous future thoughts (Cole and Kvavilashvili 2019), moments of declarative anticipatory if‐then reasoning provide a lens into deliberate cognitive processes. Mische (2009, 2014) makes a fruitful suggestion that empirical analyses of projectivity can advance sociological understandings of action and cognition in the present.…”