Spoofing Attacks Against Vehicular FMCW Radar

Komissarov, Rony; Wool, Avishai

doi:10.1145/3474376.3487283

Cited by 32 publications

(16 citation statements)

References 21 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Thus, the receiver is able to distinguish the signals sent by the radar itself, since it uses parameters for which interference from other radars can be detected [23,26]. In [33,35,38], spoofing devices based on a phase-quadrature modulator with an oscillator were proposed. They proposed sending artificial chirp signals to generate ghost responses with the same parameters as the victim radar but without transmitting the signals.…”

Section: System Overview and Theoretical Background Fmcw Radar And Ba...mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In [ 33 , 35 , 38 ], spoofing devices based on a phase-quadrature modulator with an oscillator were proposed. They proposed sending artificial chirp signals to generate ghost responses with the same parameters as the victim radar but without transmitting the signals.…”

Section: System Overview and Theoretical Backgroundmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Most of them are based on simulated platforms using software-defined radio (SDR) and evaluation radar kits used as spoofing devices. Spoofing attacks against vehicular FMCW radar have recently been studied in [ 33 ], where experimental results have been implemented using SDR at 6 GHz. Experimental studies of cyberattacks introducing an interference from another source (a radar kit at 77 GHz from Texas Instruments) and strategies based on the design of a detection threshold to minimize the attacks have also recently been presented in [ 34 ].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Spoofing Attacks on FMCW Radars with Low-Cost Backscatter Tags

Lázaro

Porcel

Lazaro

et al. 2022

Sensors

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This work studies the feasibility of using backscatter-modulated tags to introduce false information into a signal received by a frequency-modulated continuous-wave (FMCW) radar. A proof-of-concept spoofing device was designed in the 24 GHz ISM band. The spoofing device was based on an amplifier connected between two antennas, and modulation was carried out by switching the amplifier bias. The use of an amplifier allowed us to increase the level of spoofing signal compared with other modulated backscattering methods. The simulated and experimental results show that our method has the ability to generate a pair of false targets at different ranges and velocities depending on the modulation frequency of the chosen tag, since sidebands appear due to this modulation. Countermeasures to detect the spoofing attack based on changes in the slope of the frequency sweep between frames are also proposed.

show abstract

Section: System Overview and Theoretical Background Fmcw Radar And Ba...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: System Overview and Theoretical Backgroundmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Spoofing Attacks on FMCW Radars with Low-Cost Backscatter Tags

Lázaro

Porcel

Lazaro

et al. 2022

Sensors

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Due to the increased complexity of radar sensors (as compared to LiDAR and camera systems), however, only partial success has been demonstrated in constrained, simulated environments [8,9]. We begin with the analysis of the synchronized adversary due to its familiarity and simplicity.…”

Section: Baseline Scenario: Synchronized Adversarymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The complex nature of radar's hardware-physical level, e.g., use of highfrequency signals, specialized hardware, fast internal clocks, and protections against signal-noise, have made adversarial interference difficult. So far, only partial success has been shown in constrained environments [8][9][10], with the majority of research being focused on potential, mostly theoretical, countermeasures [11,12]. This is also noted in [10], which mentions that deploying spoofing attacks against commercial automotive radars operating in the mmWave frequency range, poses significant difficulties when compared to evaluations conducted in simulated or constrained wired setups.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Millimeter-Wave Automotive Radar Spoofing

Ordean¹,

Garcia²

2022

Preprint

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Millimeter-wave radar systems are one of the core components of the safety-critical Advanced Driver Assistant System (ADAS) of a modern vehicle. Due to their ability to operate efficiently despite bad weather conditions and poor visibility, they are often the only reliable sensor a car has to detect and evaluate potential dangers in the surrounding environment.In this paper, we propose several attacks against automotive radars for the purposes of assessing their reliability in realworld scenarios. Using COTS hardware, we are able to successfully interfere with automotive-grade FMCW radars operating in the commonly used 77GHz frequency band, deployed in real-world, truly wireless environments. Our strongest type of interference is able to trick the victim into detecting virtual (moving) objects. We also extend this attack with a novel method that leverages noise to remove real-world objects, thus complementing the aforementioned object spoofing attack. We evaluate the viability of our attacks in two ways. First, we establish a baseline by implementing and evaluating an unrealistically powerful adversary which requires synchronization to the victim in a limited setup that uses wire-based chirp synchronization. Later, we implement, for the first time, a truly wireless attack that evaluates a weaker but realistic adversary which is non-synchronized and does not require any adjustment feedback from the victim. Finally, we provide theoretical fundamentals for our findings, and discuss the efficiency of potential countermeasures against the proposed attacks. We plan to release our software as open-source.

show abstract

VET: Autonomous Vehicular Credential Verification Using Trajectory and Motion Vectors

Oguchi,

Ghose

2024

Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Spoofing Attacks Against Vehicular FMCW Radar

Cited by 32 publications

References 21 publications

Spoofing Attacks on FMCW Radars with Low-Cost Backscatter Tags

Spoofing Attacks on FMCW Radars with Low-Cost Backscatter Tags

Millimeter-Wave Automotive Radar Spoofing

VET: Autonomous Vehicular Credential Verification Using Trajectory and Motion Vectors

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About