It is widely believed that range resolution, the ability to distinguish between two closely situated targets, depends inversely on the bandwidth of the transmitted radar signal. Here we demonstrate a different type of ranging system, which possesses superior range resolution that is almost completely free of bandwidth limitations. By sweeping over the coherence length of the transmitted signal, the partially coherent radar experimentally demonstrates an improvement of over an order of magnitude in resolving targets, compared to standard coherent radars with the same bandwidth. A theoretical framework is developed to show that the resolution could be further improved without a bound, revealing a tradeoff between bandwidth and sweep time. This concept offers solutions to problems which require high range resolution and accuracy but available bandwidth is limited, as is the case for the autonomous car industry, optical imaging, and astronomy to name just few.

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The safety and security of the passengers in vehicles in the face of cyber attacks is a key element in the automotive industry, especially with the emergence of the Advanced Driver Assistance Systems (ADAS) and the vast improvement in Autonomous Vehicles (AVs). Such platforms use various sensors, including cameras, LiDAR and mmWave radar. These sensors themselves may present a potential security hazard if exploited by an attacker.In this paper we propose a system to attack an automotive FMCW mmWave radar, that uses fast chirp modulation. Using a single rogue radar, our attack system is capable of spoofing the distance and velocity measured by the victim vehicle simultaneously, presenting phantom measurements coherent with the laws of physics governing vehicle motion. The attacking radar controls the delay in order to spoof its distance, and uses phase compensation and control in order to spoof its velocity. After developing the attack theory, we demonstrate the spoofing attack by building a proof-of-concept hardware-based system, using a Software Defined Radio. We successfully demonstrate two real world scenarios in which the victim radar is spoofed to detect either a phantom emergency stop or a phantom acceleration, while measuring coherent range and velocity. We also discuss several countermeasures to the attack, in order to propose ways to mitigate the described attack.