Spot Pricing of Secondary Spectrum Access in Wireless Cellular Networks

Mutlu, H.; Alanyali, Murat; Starobinski, David

doi:10.1109/tnet.2009.2019959

Cited by 51 publications

(28 citation statements)

References 22 publications

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“…Thus, we expect that results obtained in [2,3,13,19,20] can be generalized to a much larger class of traffic and resource allocation models than considered therein.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 97%

Admission Control and Profitability Analysis in Dynamic Spectrum Access Data Networks

Kockan

Starobinski

2014

Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Performance Evaluation Methodologies and Tools

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New regulations grant network service providers with the right to lease their spectrum to short-term leased secondary users (SUs) for opportunistic usage. In this work, we tackle the challenge of determining admission control and pricing policies on SUs that guarantee profitability under general secondary demand and general traffic models, and accurately reflect the operation of modern cellular data networks (e.g., LTE) in which resources are shared rather than rigidly partitioned. We first analyze the joint problem of bandwidth allocation and admission control of elastic secondary users. We assume Poisson session arrivals, where each session is composed of arbitrarily distributed, and possibly correlated, on and off periods. Under balanced bandwidth allocation, we show that the steady state distribution of the number of active users in the network is insensitive to traffic characteristics beyond their means. This result holds for arbitrary occupancy-based admission control policies on SUs. Next, we prove that the optimal occupancy-based admission control policy is of threshold type, which means that secondary user arrivals are accepted when the total number of active users in the network is below a certain threshold; otherwise, they are rejected. Finally, we identify a price, referred to as the break-even price, and an admission control policy which, together, ensure profitability for any price greater than the break-even price, irrespective of the shape of the secondary demand function.

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“…Thus, we expect that results obtained in [2,3,13,19,20] can be generalized to a much larger class of traffic and resource allocation models than considered therein.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 97%

Admission Control and Profitability Analysis in Dynamic Spectrum Access Data Networks

Kockan

Starobinski

2014

Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Performance Evaluation Methodologies and Tools

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“…The contradiction between congested available spectrum bands for new applications and underutilized allocated spectrum reveals the shortcomings of the current static spectrum allocation policy. Thus, dynamic spectrum access has been considered as a promising way to improve the utilization of scarce spectrum [1]- [5].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Preference-Based Spectrum Pricing in Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks

Sheng

Hua

et al. 2018

IEEE Trans. Serv. Comput.

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(2016) Preference-based spectrum pricing in dynamic spectrum access networks. IEEE Transactions on Services Computing (99). ISSN 1939ISSN -1374 This version is available from Sussex Research Online: http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/61903/ This document is made available in accordance with publisher policies and may differ from the published version or from the version of record. If you wish to cite this item you are advised to consult the publisher's version. Please see the URL above for details on accessing the published version. Copyright and reuse:Sussex Research Online is a digital repository of the research output of the University.Copyright and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to the individual author(s) and/or other copyright owners. To the extent reasonable and practicable, the material made available in SRO has been checked for eligibility before being made available.Copies of full text items generally can be reproduced, displayed or performed and given to third parties in any format or medium for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without prior permission or charge, provided that the authors, title and full bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata page and the content is not changed in any way. Abstract-With market-driven secondary spectrum trading, licensed users can receive benefits in terms of monetary rewards or various transmission services, thus setting a fair pricing structure by suitably defining spectrum quality characteristics and accurately addressing participant's requirement is a key issue. In this paper, we investigate the pricing-based spectrum access by casting the problem of spectrum pricing into a Hotelling game model according to spectrum quality diversity. Particularly, we first build a pricing system model where unused spectrum from primary systems with different qualities forms a spectrum pool and can be divided into a number of uniform channels. A secondary user purchases a channel for usage according to its selection preference which is closely related to the channel quality and spectrum evaluation. The secondary user not only needs to consider the channel's quality and price, but also the interference cost on primary system. Detailed analysis on the policy preference of both primary system and secondary buyer are provided. By forming a game problem of spectrum pricing between primary and secondary users, we apply the Hotelling game model to handle the interaction between the participants. Specifically, by fixing Nash equilibrium of the game, an iterative algorithm for spectrum pricing is proposed based on the distribution characteristics of secondary user's preference. Essential analysis for the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium along with algorithm's convergence conditions are provided. Numerical results are also supplemented to show the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm in ensuring spectrum owner's profit.

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“…Most works look at a monopolist provider and very few take care of the competition for customers. When it comes to competition and secondary usage, cognitive networks or MVNOs, the literature is to our knowledge even more limited; see for instance [6], [7]. Competition is taken into account in [8]- [10], although through demand functions that include indirect effects.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Competition and Bargaining in Wireless Networks with Spectrum Leasing

Guijarro

Pla

Tuffin

et al. 2011

2011 IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference - GLOBECOM 2011

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Abstract-The case for a competitive market operated by a Mobile Network Operator (MNO) and a Mobile Virtual Network Operator (MVNO) is analysed in the paper. The resource that is leased by the MNO to the MVNO is spectrum. The MNO and the MVNO competeà la Bertrand posting subscription prices and the mobile users may choose to subscribe to one operator. The scenario is modeled by a three-level game comprising a bargaining game, which models the spectrum leasing by the MNO; a competition game, which models the price competition between the MNO and the MVNO; and a subscription game, which models the subscription choice by the mobile users, and the outcome of which may be either not to subscribe, to subscribe to the MNO or to subscribe to the MVNO. The game is solved through backward induction, and each level has a specific solution concept: Shapley value, for the bargain; Nash equilibrium, for the competition; and Wardrop equilibrium, for the subscription. The paper assesses which conditions lead to an equilibrium where the competition does take place, which are expressed as restrictions for the spectrum leasing price agreed at the bargaining, and the spectrum efficiency improvement achieved by the MVNO. Furthermore, it argues that the amount of the leased spectrum should be fixed exogenously in order to achieve optimal user and social welfares.

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Spot Pricing of Secondary Spectrum Access in Wireless Cellular Networks

Cited by 51 publications

References 22 publications

Admission Control and Profitability Analysis in Dynamic Spectrum Access Data Networks

Admission Control and Profitability Analysis in Dynamic Spectrum Access Data Networks

Preference-Based Spectrum Pricing in Dynamic Spectrum Access Networks

Competition and Bargaining in Wireless Networks with Spectrum Leasing

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