Stackelberg Game-Based Resource Allocation with Blockchain for Cold-Chain Logistics System

Abstract

Cold-chain logistics system (CCLS) plays the role of collecting and managing the logistics data of frozen food. However, there always exist problems of information loss, data tampering, and privacy leakage in traditional centralized systems, which influence frozen food security and people's health. The centralized management form impedes the development of the cold-chain logistics industry and weakens logistics data availability. This paper first introduces a distributed CCLS based on blockchain technology to solve the centralized management problem. This system aggregates the production base, storage, transport, detection, processing, and consumer to form a cold-chain logistics union. The blockchain ledger guarantees that the logistics data cannot be tampered with and establishes a traceability mechanism for food safety incidents. Meanwhile, to improve the value of logistics data, a Stackelberg game-based resource allocation model has been proposed between the logistics data resource provider and the consumer. The competition between resource price and volume balances the resource supplement and consumption. This model can help to achieve an optimal resource price when the Stackelberg game obtains Nash equilibrium. The two participants also can maximize their revenues with the optimal resource price and volume by utilizing the backward induction method. Then, the performance evaluations of transaction throughput and latency show that the proposed distributed CCLS is more secure and stable. The simulations about the variation trend of data price and amount, optimal benefits, and total benefits comparison of different forms show that the resource allocation model is more efficient and practical. Moreover, the blockchain-based CCLS and Stackelberg game-based resource allocation model also can promote the value of logistic data and improve social benefits.

A New Dynamic Game-Based Pricing Model for Cloud Environment

“…The backward induction method is employed in order to resolve the game and uncover the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium [38]. First, the lower level (provider level) subgames are solved.…”

Efficient Ring Signature for Cross-chain Data Sharing in Blockchain-enabled Cold-chain Logistics System

“…Hu gave a BCCLS for agricultural products, which provided a record of the whole process [12]. Zhang et al presented a distributed CCLS model and proposed a Stackelberg game-based resource allocation algorithm for resource sharing [13]. However, the cold-chain logistics data generally contains sensitive information about the logistics workers and institutions, which are vulnerable to leakage risk when they are transmitted among the cold-chain logistics workers and devices.…”