Standpoint Epistemology and Epistemic Peerhood: A Defense of Epistemic Privilege

Abstract

Standpoint epistemology is committed to the view that some epistemic advantage can be drawn from the position of powerlessness. Call this the epistemic privilege thesis. This thesis stands in need of explication and support. In providing that explication and support, I first distinguish between two readings of the thesis: the thesis that marginalized social locations confer some epistemic advantages (the epistemic advantage thesis) and the thesis that marginalized standpoints generate better, more accurate knowledge (the standpoint thesis). I then develop the former by appealing to the notion of epistemic peers available in the disagreement literature. I next turn to the latter thesis, arguing that consciousness-raising plays an analogous role in the achievement of a standpoint as training does in the achievement of expertise. The upshot of this analysis is that it clarifies that while marginalization is necessary (though not sufficient) for epistemic advantage, it is neither necessary nor sufficient for epistemic privilege.

Varieties of Bias

“…Insofar as proxies involve problematic content being conveyed in implicit, seemingly innocuous ways, the proxy problem shares important theoretical similarities with so-called "trojan horse propaganda" and dogwhistles (see especiallyTaiwo, 2017Taiwo, , 2018Saul, 2018a).37 Liao and Huebner (2021) extend the functional account of bias even further, recognizing bias as existing wholly outside of individuals, and giving a theory of "oppressive objects".38 For further discussion of the role of values in algorithms and scientific practice, seeRudner (1953),Levi (1960),Douglas (2000Douglas ( , 2009Douglas ( , 2016,Rooney (1992),Longino (1995Longino ( , 1996,Dotan (2020), andKasirzadeh and Gabriel (2023), among others.39 This sentiment has been largely taken up in the recent surge in work on pragmatic and moral encroachment. See citations in note 17.40 For helpful introductions and summaries of standpoint epistemology, seeToole (2019Toole ( , 2023. JOHNSON…”