State-Wide Elections, Optical Scan Voting Systems, and the Pursuit of Integrity

Abstract

Abstract-In recent years, two distinct electronic voting technologies have been introduced and extensively utilized in election procedures: direct recording electronic (DRE) systems and optical scanner (OS) systems. The latter are typically deemed safer, as they inherently provide a voter verifiable paper trail that enables hand-counted audits and recounts that rely on direct voter input. For this reason, optical scanner machines have been widely deployed in the United States. Despite the growing popularity of these machines, they are known to suffer from various security vulnerabilities that, if left unchecked, can compromise the integrity of elections in which the machines are used. This article studies general auditing procedures designed to enhance the integrity of elections conducted with optical scan equipment and, additionally, describes the specific auditing procedures currently in place in the State of Connecticut. We present an abstract view of a typical OS voting technology and its relationship to the general election process. With this in place, we lay down a "temporal-resource" adversarial model, providing a simple language for describing the disruptive power of a potential adversary. Finally, we identify how audit procedures, injected at various critical stages before, during, and after an election, can frustrate such adversarial interference and so contribute to election integrity.We present the implementation of such auditing procedures for elections in the State of Connecticut utilizing the Premiere (Diebold) AccuVote optical scanner; these audits were conducted by the UConn VoTeR Center, at the University of Connecticut, on request of the Office of the Secretary of the State. We discuss the effectiveness of such procedures in every stage of the process and we present results and observations gathered from the analysis of past election data.

Blockchain-Based Electronic Voting System: Significance and Requirements

“…In traditional methods, voters mark paper ballots by hand [4] or involve mechanical lever machines [5]. Within electronic voting [6], there are many types such as punched-card [7], direct recording electronic [8], optical scanning systems [9], vote recorder [10], i-voting [11], and so forth [12]. Table 1 categorizes some existing voting systems.…”

Ballot-Polling Risk Limiting Audits for IRV Elections

“…Stark and Teague (2014) present RLAs for D'Hondt (and similar) elections, applicable in a number of European countries such as Norway, Michelle Blom 1 , Peter J. Stuckey 2 , Vanessa J. Teague 1 Germany, Luxembourg, and Denmark. General auditing procedures designed to enhance electoral integrity have been outlined by Antonyan et al (2009). The BRAVO ballot-polling RLA , designed for FPTP elections, forms the basis of our IRV ballot-polling audits.…”

Systematic Measurement of Marginal Mark Types on Voting Ballots

“…The use of optical scan paper ballot systems has been on the rise and they are among the most widely used electronic voting equipment in the United States [1]. In 2012, 56 % of voters used a paper ballot with an optical scan machine during the presidential election [2].…”