Stateless-Recipient Certified E-Mail System Based on Verifiable Encryption

Ateniese, Giuseppe; Nita-Rotaru, Cristina

doi:10.1007/3-540-45760-7_13

Cited by 43 publications

(61 citation statements)

References 17 publications

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“…The malleability of transactions comes from the fact, that a hash of a transaction is computed over the whole transaction including its input scripts. On the other hand, signatures are computed only over the body of the transaction, which means that they do not cover the input scripts 4 . Therefore, one can tweak an input script in a way that does not change its functionality (e.g.…”

Section: Bitcoin Improvement Proposalmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Moreover, if one party, say Alice, cheats then Bob will earn Alice's deposit (plus he will get his own deposit back), which will compensate his loses resulting from the fact that Alice cheated during the contract signing protocol. Of course, our protocols can be used in several other applications that rely on a fair exchange of secrets, such as certified e-mail systems [31,4,1] or non-repudiation protocols [30].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Fair Two-Party Computations via Bitcoin Deposits

Andrychowicz

Dziembowski

Malinowski

et al. 2014

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

122

101

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Abstract. We show how the Bitcoin currency system (with a small modification) can be used to obtain fairness in any two-party secure computation protocol in the following sense: if one party aborts the protocol after learning the output then the other party gets a financial compensation (in bitcoins). One possible application of such protocols is the fair contract signing: each party is forced to complete the protocol, or to pay to the other one a fine. We also show how to link the output of this protocol to the Bitcoin currency. More precisely: we show a method to design secure two-party protocols for functionalities that result in a "forced" financial transfer from one party to the other. Our protocols build upon the ideas of our recent paper "Secure Multiparty Computations on Bitcoin" (Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2013/784). Compared to that paper, our results are more general, since our protocols allow to compute any function, while in the previous paper we concentrated only on some specific tasks (commitment schemes and lotteries). On the other hand, as opposed to "Secure Multiparty Computations on Bitcoin", to obtain security we need to modify the Bitcoin specification so that the transactions are "non-malleable" (we discuss this concept in more detail in the paper).

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Section: Bitcoin Improvement Proposalmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Fair Two-Party Computations via Bitcoin Deposits

Andrychowicz

Dziembowski

Malinowski

et al. 2014

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

122

101

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…The interesting case is the optimistic case, where there exists a trusted third party (TTP), but the TTP is not involved if both participants are honest [4,3,7,6,43,5,35]. Multi-party Fair Exchange: Franklin and Tsudik [25] classified multi-party fair exchange based on the number of items that a participant can exchange and the dispositions of the participants.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Optimally Efficient Multi-Party Fair Exchange and Fair Secure Multi-Party Computation

Kılınç

Küpçü

2015

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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Multi-party fair exchange (MFE) and fair secure multi-party computation (fair SMPC) are under-studied fields of research, with practical importance. We examine MFE scenarios where every participant has some item, and at the end of the protocol, either every participant receives every other participant's item, or no participant receives anything. This is a particularly hard scenario, even though it is directly applicable to protocols such as fair SMPC or multi-party contract signing. We further generalize our protocol to work for any exchange topology. We analyze the case where a trusted third party (TTP) is optimistically available, although we emphasize that the trust put on the TTP is only regarding the fairness, and our protocols preserve the privacy of the exchanged items even against a malicious TTP.We construct an asymptotically optimal (for the complete topology) multi-party fair exchange protocol that requires a constant number of rounds, in comparison to linear, and O(n 2 ) messages, in comparison to cubic, where n is the number of participating parties. We enable the parties to efficiently exchange any item that can be efficiently put into a verifiable escrow (e.g., signatures on a contract). We show how to apply this protocol on top of any SMPC protocol to achieve a fairness guarantee with very little overhead, especially if the SMPC protocol works with arithmetic circuits. Our protocol guarantees fairness in its strongest sense: even if all n − 1 other participants are malicious and colluding, fairness will hold.

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“…, B n }, according to Table 1, which represents a more realistic scenario. However, assurance of these properties entails strong cryptographic operations [15], and thus, increased computational cost for the protocol's participants. It is therefore questionable whether a secure protocol, such as the one described, can effectively operate over environments characterized by requirements for low-cost hardware, such as mobile devices.…”

Section: The Cemd Protocolmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…According to [14,15], the CTMC model of CEMD protocol is designed in respect to the following characteristics:…”

Section: The Cemd Protocolmentioning

confidence: 99%

Quantitative analysis of a certified e-mail protocol in mobile environments: A probabilistic model checking approach

Basagiannis

Petridou

Αλεξίου

et al. 2011

Computers & Security

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Formal analysis techniques, such as probabilistic model checking, offer an effective mechanism for model-based performance and verification studies of communication systems' behavior that can be abstractly described by a set of rules i.e., a protocol. This article presents an integrated approach for the quantitative analysis of the Certified E-mail Message Delivery (CEMD) protocol that provides security properties to electronic mail services. The proposed scheme employs a probabilistic model checking analysis and provides for the first time insights on the impact of CEMD's error tolerance on computational and transmission cost. It exploits an efficient combination of quantitative analysis and specific computational and communication parameters, i.e., the widely used Texas Instruments TMS320C55x Family operating in an High Speed Downlink Packet Access (HSDPA) mobile environment, where multiple CEMD participants execute parallel sessions with high bit error rates (BERs). Furthermore, it offers a tool-assistant approach for the protocol designers and analysts towards the verification of their products under varying parameters. Finally, this analysis can be also utilized towards reliably addressing cost-related issues of certain communication protocols and deciding on their cost-dependent viability, taking into account limitations that are introduced by hardware specifications of mobile devices and noisy mobile environments.

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Stateless-Recipient Certified E-Mail System Based on Verifiable Encryption

Cited by 43 publications

References 17 publications

Fair Two-Party Computations via Bitcoin Deposits

Fair Two-Party Computations via Bitcoin Deposits

Optimally Efficient Multi-Party Fair Exchange and Fair Secure Multi-Party Computation

Quantitative analysis of a certified e-mail protocol in mobile environments: A probabilistic model checking approach

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