We describe INTO-CPS, a project that aims to realise the goal of integrated tool chains for the collaborative and multidisciplinary engineering of dependable Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs). Challenges facing model-based CPS engineering are described, focussing on the semantic diversity of models, management of the large space of models and artefacts produced in CPS engineering, and the need to evaluate effectiveness in industrial settings. We outline the approach taken to each of these issues, particularly on the use of semantically integrated multi-models, links to architectural modelling, code generation and testing, and evaluation via industry-led studies. We describe progress on the development of a prototype tool chain from baseline tools, and discuss ongoing challenges and open research questions in this area.

No abstract

No abstract

Abstract-We use the probabilistic model checker PRISM to formally model and analyze the highly publicized Kaminsky DNS cache-poisoning attack. DNS (Domain Name System) is an internet-wide, hierarchical naming system used to translate domain names such as google.com into physical IP addresses such as 208.77.188.166. The Kaminsky DNS attack is a recently discovered vulnerability in DNS that allows an intruder to hijack a domain; i.e. corrupt a DNS server so that it replies with the IP address of a malicious web server when asked to resolve URLs within a non-malicious domain such as google.com. A proposed fix for the attack is based on the idea of randomizing the source port a DNS server uses when issuing a query to another server in the DNS hierarchy.We use PRISM to introduce a Continuous Time Markov Chain representation of the Kaminsky attack and the proposed fix, and to perform the required probabilistic model checking. Our results, gleaned from more than 240 PRISM runs, formally validate the existence of the Kaminsky cache-poisoning attack even in the presence of an intruder with virtually no knowledge of the victim DNS server's actions. They also serve to quantify the effectiveness of the proposed fix: using nonlinear least-squares curve fitting, we show that the probability of a successful attack obeys a 1/N distribution, where N is the upper limit on the range of source-port ids. We also demonstrate an increasing attack probability with an increasing number of attempted attacks or increasing rate at which the intruder guesses the source-port id.

We describe an approach to the model‐based engineering of cyber‐physical systems that permits the coupling of diverse discrete‐event and continuous‐time models and their simulators. A case study in the building automation domain demonstrates how such co‐models and co‐simulation can promote early cooperation between disciplines within a systems engineering process before the expensive commitment is made to integration in physical prototypes. We identify areas for future advances in foundations, methods and tools to realise the potential of a co‐modelling approach within established systems engineering processes.