“…Let me first consider a variation of the Gatecrasher Paradox offered by Blome‐Tillmann against Enoch et al’s () solution to the problem of statistical evidence: The First of the Gatecrashers : It's Sunday afternoon and Hannah decides to gatecrash the local rodeo. As she climbs the fence, a large number of people in the ticket line get the same idea and follow her dubious example.…”
Section: Normalcy and The Problem Of Statistical Evidencementioning
This article examines Smith's recent treatment of the problem of statistical evidence and the conception of epistemic justification that he puts forward. Two possible solutions to the problem of statistical evidence that result from his analysis of cases involving a contrast between statistical and individual evidence are considered. The solution resulting from Smith's conception of epistemic justification is shown to be inferior to the solution calling for an explanationist conception of epistemic justification. As a result, Smith's analysis of cases illustrating the problem of statistical evidence, given his own standards of theory choice, is shown to support an explanationist conception of epistemic justification as an alternative to the probabilistic conception that he urges us to reject.
“…Let me first consider a variation of the Gatecrasher Paradox offered by Blome‐Tillmann against Enoch et al’s () solution to the problem of statistical evidence: The First of the Gatecrashers : It's Sunday afternoon and Hannah decides to gatecrash the local rodeo. As she climbs the fence, a large number of people in the ticket line get the same idea and follow her dubious example.…”
Section: Normalcy and The Problem Of Statistical Evidencementioning
This article examines Smith's recent treatment of the problem of statistical evidence and the conception of epistemic justification that he puts forward. Two possible solutions to the problem of statistical evidence that result from his analysis of cases involving a contrast between statistical and individual evidence are considered. The solution resulting from Smith's conception of epistemic justification is shown to be inferior to the solution calling for an explanationist conception of epistemic justification. As a result, Smith's analysis of cases illustrating the problem of statistical evidence, given his own standards of theory choice, is shown to support an explanationist conception of epistemic justification as an alternative to the probabilistic conception that he urges us to reject.
“…In two recent papers, Enoch and Fisher (2015) and Enoch, Spectre, and Fisher () aim to shed light on the distinction between individual and bare statistical evidence in terms of Nozick's () notion of sensitivity. According to them, courts need sensitive evidence for the just imposition of liability.…”
Section: Enoch Et Al's Approach: Sensitivitymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Instead, Enoch et al could be taken to defend the view that sensitivity and the individuality of evidence often or usually go together, but not necessarily. In fact, some formulations in (Enoch, Spectre, and Fisher ) suggest such a softened approach:Sensitivity‐like counterfactuals capture—often enough, in sufficiently central cases—an epistemically relevant feature of the distinction between statistical and individual evidence. (Enoch, Spectre, and Fisher , p. 209)…”
Section: Weakening the View?mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Sensitivity‐like counterfactuals capture—often enough, in sufficiently central cases—an epistemically relevant feature of the distinction between statistical and individual evidence. (Enoch, Spectre, and Fisher , p. 209)…”
Recent attempts to resolve the Paradox of the Gatecrasher rest on a now familiar distinction between individual and bare statistical evidence. This paper investigates two such approaches, the causal approach to individual evidence and a recently influential (and award-winning) modal account that explicates individual evidence in terms of Nozick's notion of sensitivity. This paper offers counterexamples to both approaches, explicates a problem concerning necessary truths for the sensitivity account, and argues that either view is implausibly committed to the impossibility of no-fault wrongful convictions. The paper finally concludes that the distinction between individual and bare statistical evidence cannot be maintained in terms of causation or sensitivity. We have to look elsewhere for a solution of the Paradox of the Gatecrasher.
“…The connection between liability judgments and knowledge judgments has been the subject of recent attention from philosophers. For two somewhat contrasting views see Enoch and colleagues (Enoch, Spectre, & Fisher, 2012) and Blome-Tillmann (2016). 23.…”
In this paper, we present the results of two surveys that investigate subjects' judgments about what can be known or justifiably believed about lottery outcomes on the basis of statistical evidence, testimonial evidence, and "mixed" evidence, while considering possible anchoring and priming effects. We discuss these results in light of seven distinct hypotheses that capture various claims made by philosophers about lay people's lottery judgments. We conclude by summarizing the main findings, pointing to future research, and comparing our findings to recent studies by Turri and Friedman.
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