Stealthy Sensor Attack Detection and Real-Time Performance Recovery for Resilient CPS

Kim, Sangjun; Eun, Yongsoon; Park, Kyung‐Joon

doi:10.1109/tii.2021.3052182

Cited by 39 publications

(16 citation statements)

References 25 publications

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“…We implement a wireless NCS testbed. The testbed consists of a physical system emulator [25], two computing systems, two APs, and an attacker, as shown in Fig. 4.…”

Section: A Testbed Environmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Real-Time Controller Reconfiguration for Delay-Resilient Cyber-Physical Systems

Kim¹,

Lee

Park

2022

IEEE Access

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Networks on the cyber-physical systems (CPSs) configure feedback control loops between physical systems in the real world and control software in the cyber world. Malicious behaviors on the networks can increase network delays by exhausting limited network resources and security vulnerabilities to destabilize CPSs, which are entitled the network delay attack. In this paper, we focus on the problem of how to guarantee the stability of CPS under the network delay attack. We propose a real-time controller reconfiguration to ensure the resiliency of the physical systems against the network delay attack. Our controller reconfiguration consists of two algorithms: controller gain tuning and access point (AP) handover, which give a delay tolerance and an attack avoidance, respectively. Depending on the network delays, the computing system adopts one of these two algorithms and mitigates the physical impacts of the network delay attack. We validate that the proposed controller reconfiguration can ensure the resiliency of CPS against the network delay attack by implementing a testbed with wireless networks.INDEX TERMS Attack-resilient CPS, controller reconfiguration, cyber-physical systems, flooding attack.

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“…We implement a wireless NCS testbed. The testbed consists of a physical system emulator [25], two computing systems, two APs, and an attacker, as shown in Fig. 4.…”

Section: A Testbed Environmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We use an integrated absolute error (IAE) as a metric to evaluate the recovery performance [25], [27]. IAE is defined as an integral of the absolute value of an error between the DC motor angle θ(t) and reference angle θ r (t).…”

Section: ) When the Attack-induced Delay Is In The Feasible Stability...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Real-Time Controller Reconfiguration for Delay-Resilient Cyber-Physical Systems

Kim¹,

Lee

Park

2022

IEEE Access

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“…Pole-dynamics attacks are typical covert cyber-physical attacks based on system theory that tampers with controlrelated information in communication networks. To counter PDA, Kim et al [129] suggested a real-time resilient CPS framework. The proposed architecture is a holistic approach needed to detect, isolate, and recover from the PDA in realtime.…”

Section: Stochastic Resiliencymentioning

confidence: 99%

Security of Multi-Agent Cyber-Physical Systems: A Survey

Owoputi

Ray

2022

IEEE Access

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Multi-agent systems are becoming increasingly popular due to their successful implementation in several sectors. However, there are a variety of threats that might undermine the agent's security and imperil system security. As a result, security concerns should be addressed during the design of multi-agent systems. This survey reviews different models for securing multi-agent systems, which were developed based on the concepts regarding the agent's role and communications. This paper presents and categorizes the most common attacks on MASs. Then, we study and analyze numerous security strategies in the literature, classifying them as prevention, detection, and resiliency approaches based on reputation and trust. Finally, we recommend which security approach is the best countermeasure for specific types of attacks based on recent advances in the research field.

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“…Therefore, stealthiness is a necessary condition, and attack performance is the attacker’s goal. Existing work focuses on FDI attacks with particular stealth performance metrics, such as stealthy attacks [ 15 , 16 , 17 ], covert attacks [ 18 , 19 ], zero-dynamics attacks [ 20 ], optimal stealthy attacks [ 21 ], perfect stealthy attacks [ 22 ], and unpredictable attacks [ 23 ]. These attack strategies have a common design idea, that is, maximizing the attack impacts of the physical plant while ensuring the attacks cannot be detected by some specific detectors.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Multiplicative Attacks with Essential Stealthiness in Sensor and Actuator Loops against Cyber-Physical Systems

Chen

Liu

et al. 2023

Sensors

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Stealthy attacks in sensor and actuator loops are the research priorities in the security of cyber-physical systems. Existing attacks define the stealthiness conditions against the Chi-square or Kullback-Leibler divergence detectors and parameterize the attack model based on additive signals. Such conditions ignore the potential anomalies of the vulnerable outputs in the control layer, and the attack sequences need to be generated online, increasing the hardware and software costs. This paper investigates a type of multiplicative attack with essential stealthiness where the employed model is a novel form. The advantage is that the parameters can be designed in a constant form without having to be generated online. An essential stealthiness condition is proposed for the first time and complements the existing ones. Two sufficient conditions for the existence of constant attack matrices are given in the form of theorems, where two methods for decoupling the unknown variables are particularly considered. A quadruple-tank process, an experimental platform for attack and defense, is developed to verify the theoretical results. The experiments indicate that the proposed attack strategy can fulfill both the attack performance and stealthiness conditions.

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Stealthy Sensor Attack Detection and Real-Time Performance Recovery for Resilient CPS

Cited by 39 publications

References 25 publications

Real-Time Controller Reconfiguration for Delay-Resilient Cyber-Physical Systems

Real-Time Controller Reconfiguration for Delay-Resilient Cyber-Physical Systems

Security of Multi-Agent Cyber-Physical Systems: A Survey

Multiplicative Attacks with Essential Stealthiness in Sensor and Actuator Loops against Cyber-Physical Systems

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