Cyber-physical attacks exploit intrinsic natures of physical systems and can severely damage cyber-physical systems (CPSs) without being detected by the conventional anomaly detector. In this paper, based on software-defined networking, we propose a holistic resilient CPS framework that can detect, isolate, and recover from cyber-physical attacks in real-time. To show the effectiveness of the proposed framework, we focus on the pole-dynamics attack (PDA), a newly reported stealthy sensor attack that can make the physical system unstable. We develop an efficient detection algorithm for PDA and embed it into the proposed framework. By implementing a testbed, we validate that the proposed framework guarantees resilience of CPS against the PDA.
A cyber-physical system (CPS) is the integration of a physical system into the real world and control applications in a computing system, interacting through a communications network. Network technology connecting physical systems and computing systems enables the simultaneous control of many physical systems and provides intelligent applications for them. However, enhancing connectivity leads to extended attack vectors in which attackers can trespass on the network and launch cyber-physical attacks, remotely disrupting the CPS. Therefore, extensive studies into cyber-physical security are being conducted in various domains, such as physical, network, and computing systems. Moreover, large-scale and complex CPSs make it difficult to analyze and detect cyber-physical attacks, and thus, machine learning (ML) techniques have recently been adopted for cyber-physical security. In this survey, we provide an extensive review of the threats and ML-based security designs for CPSs. First, we present a CPS structure that classifies the functions of the CPS into three layers: the physical system, the network, and software applications. Then, we discuss the taxonomy of cyber-physical attacks on each layer, and in particular, we analyze attacks based on the dynamics of the physical system. We review existing studies on detecting cyber-physical attacks with various ML techniques from the perspectives of the physical system, the network, and the computing system. Furthermore, we discuss future research directions for ML-based cyber-physical security research in the context of real-time constraints, resiliency, and dataset generation to learn about the possible attacks.
Controller failures can result in unsafe physical plant operations and deteriorated performance in industrial cyber–physical systems. In this paper, we present a controller switching mechanism over wireless sensor–actuator networks to enhance the resiliency of control systems against problems and potential physical failures. The proposed mechanism detects controller failures and quickly switches to the backup controller to ensure the stability of the control system in case the primary controller fails. To show the efficacy of our proposed method, we conduct a performance evaluation using a hardware-in-the-loop testbed that considers both the actual wireless network protocol and the simulated physical system. Results demonstrate that the proposed scheme recovers quickly by switching to a backup controller in the case of controller failure.
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