Stereotypic biases in social decision making and memory: Testing process models of stereotype use.

Abstract

Two information-processing mechanisms that could potentially contribute to judgmental discrimination against the members of stereotyped social groups were examined in two experiments, using a mock juror decision-making task. Both postulated mechanisms involve biased processing of judgment-relevant evidence. The interpretation hypothesis asserts that the activation of stereotypic concepts influences the perceived probative implications of other evidence. The selective processing hypothesis asserts that stereotype-consistent evidence is processed more extensively than is inconsistent evidence. Judgment and memory data from the first experiment supported the general notion that stereotype-based discrimination emerges from biased evidence processing. The specific pattern of results supported selective processing rather than interpretation biases as the critical process underlying observed judgmental discrimination. The second experiment corroborated this conclusion by showing that a manipulation that prevents selective processing of the evidence effectively eliminated biases in judgments and recall pertaining to stereotyped targets. Implications for a general understanding of stereotyping and discrimination are discussed.

Will a category cue attract you? Motor output reveals dynamic competition across person construal.

“…For the social psychologist, the activation of a category marks a virulent chain of events to powerfully affect social behavior and interpersonal interaction. Following the trigger of a social category is the spontaneous activation of all contained stereotypes and attitudes (Devine, 1989;Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986;Lepore & Brown, 1997), changing what we think about others (Bodenhausen, 1988;Brewer, 1988;Fiske & Neuberg, 1990), feel about them (Bargh, Chaiken, Govender, & Pratto, 1992;Fazio et al, 1986), and how we behave with and treat them (Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996;Chen & Bargh, 1999). These influences often trickle down to even the lower level processes, including basic vision and memory, warping the way we quite literally perceive or envision others (MacLin & Malpass, 2001) and remember them (Hamilton & Sherman, 1994;Srull & Wyer, 1989).…”

“…When and how social categories come to be automatically activated is an ongoing line of inquiry in social cognition because, as social psychological research has charted quite thoroughly, the mere activation of a social category representation consequentially affects subsequent interaction, judgment, and behavior. Activated category representations shape subsequent encoding and representation of any information relevant to the target (Bodenhausen, 1988). After a social category is activated, its corresponding knowledge structure becomes a lens that molds the judgments perceivers make and impressions they form (Brewer, 1988;Fiske & Neuberg, 1990), and distorts perceivers' memories of a target (Hamilton & Sherman, 1994).…”

Do Payment Mechanisms Change the Way Consumers Perceive Products?

“…This activation of different associations in memory biases the processing of subsequently encountered stimuli in predictable ways (Bodenhausen 1988;Darley and Gross 1983). For example, Bodenhausen (1988) argues that the activation of a mental concept may lead to differential processing of subsequently encountered stimulus, depending on its consistency with the implications of the activated concept. Evidence that is consistent with the activated concept may receive more attention and rehearsal and may therefore be much more likely to be incorporated into the decision maker's mental representation of the scenario compared to inconsistent information.…”

Person theories and attention allocation: Preferences for stereotypic versus counterstereotypic information.

“…These strategies can be grouped into three broad categories, two of which lead to stereotype preservation. First, perceivers may decrease their engagement with the stereotype-inconsistent information and instead focus on stereotype-consistent information, thereby accumulating in memory more confirming evidence than disconfirming evidence (e.g., Bodenhausen, 1988;Macrae, Hewstone, & Griffiths, 1993;D. T. Miller & Turnbull, 1986;Snyder & Swann, 1978).…”