Stick To What You Know

Sutton, Jonathan

doi:10.1111/j.0029-4624.2005.00506.x

Cited by 106 publications

(60 citation statements)

References 24 publications

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“…5 See Adler (2002), Conee and Feldman (2004), Shah (2006), and Steup (2001) for defenses of evidentialism. Williamson (2000) defends the knowledge account as does Bird (2007), Huemer (2008), and Sutton (2005Sutton ( , 2007. Adler (2002) might defend both views.…”

Section: Reasons and Demandsmentioning

confidence: 88%

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Reasons and belief's justification

Littlejohn¹

2011

Reasons for Belief

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Section: Reasons and Demandsmentioning

confidence: 88%

“…30 The problem with this 29 Bird (2007: 95). 30 Sutton (2005Sutton ( , 2007 defends the view. Hawthorne and Stanley (2008) express some sympathy for the idea that p is a reason for belief iff p is known.…”

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confidence: 99%

Reasons and belief's justification

Littlejohn¹

2011

Reasons for Belief

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“…If the deontic intuition is independent of the analysis of knowledge, the defender of LIC has the resources to explain away such an intuition, in other words, show that the intuition is defective in some way, in the same manner in which we can explain why illusions should not be considered to be cases of veridical perception. She can claim that it is a mistaken application of the deontic intuition (mistaken in applying it to the analysis of knowledge) which we are led into making because of the errant assumption that 5 Jonathan Sutton has argued (Sutton 2005(Sutton , 2007) that we can account for such deontic requirements even if we drop talk of epistemic justification, and to paraphrase him ''stick to what we know''. According to him, one is only deontologically justified in believing that p if one knows that p. This means that one cannot, after all, have justified, false beliefs.…”

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confidence: 99%

The Theory of Epistemic Justification and the Theory of Knowledge: A Divorce

Booth

2010

Erkenn

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Richard Foley has suggested that the search for a good theory of epistemic justification and the analysis of knowledge should be conceived of as two distinct projects. However, he has not offered much support for this claim, beyond highlighting certain salutary consequences it might have. In this paper, I offer some further support for Foley's claim by offering an argument and a way to conceive the claim in a way that makes it as plausible as its denial, and thus levelling the playing field. The burden of proof then lies with those who seek to deny Foley's radical suggestion.Richard Foley has suggested that the search for a good theory of epistemic justification and the analysis of knowledge should be conceived of as two distinct projects. However, he has not really offered an argument for this claim. Instead, he has offered the idea that externalists and internalists are engaged in different projects (the former in the analysis of knowledge, the latter in the theory of epistemic justification) as an ''interesting reading'' (Foley 2001, p. 13) of what many contemporary epistemologists are doing, and as a way of resolving certain standing (and seemingly intractable) debates (see also Foley 2003Foley , 2004. At most, the suggestion can be seen as an inference to the best explanation, given the current state of the discipline.In this paper, I will offer an argument for the strong claim that the search for a good theory of epistemic justification and the analysis of knowledge are logically independent projects; in other words, epistemic justification is neither necessary nor sufficient for knowledge, and there is independent motivation for why epistemologists should be concerned with developing theories of epistemic justification (call this thesis LIC-the logical independence claim). Or, rather, I want to argue that the

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“…• JSW underwrites (c) Sutton's (2005Sutton's ( , 2007 assertion argument for the thesis that epistemically justified belief suffices for knowledge, as well as (d) a recent argument from Wright (1996) against the view that knowledge is required for warrant to assert (the "left-to-right" direction of the KAA).…”

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confidence: 99%

“…This and other similar putative counterexamples to KIS thus depend on DID. (c) Sutton (2005Sutton ( , 2007 argues that epistemically justified belief suffices for knowledge: you hold a justified belief in P only if you know P. Call this thesis justification entails knowledge (JEK). Obviously, Sutton's arguments for JEK threaten numerous common views-e.g., that there can be justified false beliefs; that "Gettierized" beliefs are justified but not knowledge; that you can justifiedly believe you'll lose the lottery without knowing it; that we can use epistemic justification to provide a noncircular analysis of knowledge; and so on.…”

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confidence: 99%

Two claims about epistemic propriety

Coffman

2010

Synthese

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This paper has two main parts. In the first part, I argue that prominent moves in two related current debates in epistemology-viz., the debates over classical invariantism and the knowledge first movement-depend on one or the other of two claims about epistemic propriety: (1) Impropriety due to lack of a particular epistemic feature suffices for epistemic impropriety; and (2) Having justification to believe P suffices for having warrant to assert P. In the second part, I present and defend novel arguments against both claims.

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Stick To What You Know

Cited by 106 publications

References 24 publications

Reasons and belief's justification

Reasons and belief's justification

The Theory of Epistemic Justification and the Theory of Knowledge: A Divorce

Two claims about epistemic propriety

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