Store-Assistance Management for a Supply Chain with Consumer Return under Consignment Contract

Wu, Zhihui; Chen, Dongyan; Yu, Hui

doi:10.1155/2017/4937217

Cited by 3 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 41 publications

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“…These linear demand functions are widely used in economics and supply chain management research [28][29][30][31][32][33]. Here, the parameter k(>0) represents the potential market size.…”

Section: Problem Description and Basic Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Optimal Decisions in a Sea-Cargo Supply Chain with Two Competing Freight Forwarders Considering Altruistic Preference and Brand Investment

Duoqing

Liu

et al. 2023

Systems

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Maritime transportation is a crucial component of international cargo transport, offering several advantages, such as route flexibility, large capacity, and cost-effectiveness. The competition and collaboration among the node enterprises in the sea-cargo supply chain system (SCSCS) directly impact the overall structure and efficiency of the supply chain system, introducing complexity in analysis. This research focuses on a two-level SCSCS comprising one shipping company and two competing freight forwarders, considering their altruistic preferences manifested through contributing to the shipping company’s brand building. Employing a Stackelberg game model, this study examines the effects of the shipping company’s brand investment willingness and the freight forwarders’ altruistic preferences on the decision making and profits of all stakeholders. The findings reveal that a higher willingness of the shipping company to invest in its brand building leads to increased profits for all parties involved. However, while the altruistic behaviors of the freight forwarders can enhance the shipping company’s profits, their own profits may not necessarily see the same impact. Furthermore, moderate competition between the freight forwarders can enhance the profits for all members. This research identifies the circumstances in which the freight forwarders’ altruistic preferences can lead to increased profits for themselves, achieving both altruistic and self-interested outcomes.

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“…These linear demand functions are widely used in economics and supply chain management research [28][29][30][31][32][33]. Here, the parameter k(>0) represents the potential market size.…”

Section: Problem Description and Basic Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Optimal Decisions in a Sea-Cargo Supply Chain with Two Competing Freight Forwarders Considering Altruistic Preference and Brand Investment

Duoqing

Liu

et al. 2023

Systems

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Thus, the life and property safety of passengers can be protected, and the service quality level of the enterprise can be improved. Referring to the assumption of the service quality level for the enterprise in Wu et al (2017), we can assume that the changing rule of the service quality level of the enterprise with time is…”

Section: Model Assumptionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Research on Government-Enterprise Regulation of Online Car-Hailing Based on Differential Game

et al. 2022

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In the Internet era, with the widespread application of digital technology, the way people travel has changed. Compared with traditional taxis, more and more people prefer to choose online car-hailing. The rapid development of the online car-hailing industry has solved the problem of taxi-hailing to a certain extent, but it has also brought some new problems. To change the dilemma of the online car-hailing industry, it is necessary to strengthen the regulation of the online car-hailing industry. In this study, we consider the regulatory system composed of a local government and an enterprise and use the differential game to study the regulation of online car-hailing. In the Nash non-cooperative game, Stackelberg master–slave game, and cooperative game, we, respectively, investigate the indicators, such as the optimal regulatory effort of the government, the optimal regulatory effort of the enterprise, the optimal benefit function of the government, the optimal benefit function of the enterprise, the optimal benefit function of the system, the optimal trajectory of the service quality level for the enterprise, and the optimal trajectory of the goodwill for the enterprise. Moreover, we analyze the corresponding conclusions through examples. We obtained some important results. (i) In the Stackelberg master–slave game, the optimal ratio of the local government subsidy to the enterprise's regulatory cost is only related to the benefit distribution coefficient and has nothing to do with other factors. Moreover, when the benefit distribution coefficient is >1/3, the local government is willing to share the regulatory cost of the enterprise. Otherwise, the local government refuses to share the regulatory cost of the enterprise. (ii) Compared with the Nash non-cooperative game, the optimal regulatory effort of the local government remains unchanged in the Stackelberg master–slave game, but the optimal benefit of the local government increases. Moreover, when the benefit distribution coefficient is >1/3, both the optimal regulatory effort and the optimal benefit of the enterprise increase. (iii) Compared with the Stackelberg master–slave game, in the cooperative game, the optimal regulatory effort of both government and enterprise increases, and the system's optimal benefit also increases. (iv) From the Nash non-cooperative game to the Stackelberg master–slave game and then to the cooperative game when the benefit distribution coefficient is >1/3, the service quality level and goodwill of the enterprise all increase.

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“…Wang et al establish a two-stage dynamic programming model to analyze the retailer's ordering behavior, and apply price protection ideas to design a coordination contract [22]. Wu et al describe the dynamic evolution process of the store auxiliary service level and the influence of the store auxiliary service level on the product return rate and design a dynamic consignment price contract [48]. Based on this research, Wu and Chen consider the return processing cost and the impact of returns on demand [49].…”

Section: Differential Gamementioning

confidence: 99%

Differential Game Model of a Fresh Dual-Channel Supply Chain Under Different Return Modes

Zhang

2021

IEEE Access

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Store-Assistance Management for a Supply Chain with Consumer Return under Consignment Contract

Cited by 3 publications

References 41 publications

Optimal Decisions in a Sea-Cargo Supply Chain with Two Competing Freight Forwarders Considering Altruistic Preference and Brand Investment

Optimal Decisions in a Sea-Cargo Supply Chain with Two Competing Freight Forwarders Considering Altruistic Preference and Brand Investment

Research on Government-Enterprise Regulation of Online Car-Hailing Based on Differential Game

Differential Game Model of a Fresh Dual-Channel Supply Chain Under Different Return Modes

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