Strategic customer behavior and optimal policies in a passenger–taxi double-ended queueing system with multiple access points and nonzero matching times

Optimal strategy and system performance ina feedback queue with customer-intensiveservices and boundedly rational customers

“…Proof. According to (7), there is a one-to-one mapping between P and q, so max P SR is equivalent to max q SR. Differentiating SR with respect to q, we obtain…”

“…Combining Theorem 3.3, we know that µ * SR decreases with β. (7) gives the relation between P * SR and q * SR , it is obvious that the optimal service price P * SR increases with β when customers' actual utility is negative, while the effect of β on the optimal service price P * SR is uncertain when customer actual utility is non-nagative. , the customers' rational level is low, and the service providers will set a higher service price and lower service rate, which leads to the negative utility of customers.…”

“…In a feedback queue, customers decide whether to join or not by a utility function, which measures the trade-off between the service reward and waiting cost. In queuing contexts, this trade-off can be introduced to many scenarios, such as passenger-taxi service system [6,7], modern call-center software system [8] and other scenarios [5,9]. These studies generally assume that the customers are homogeneous with respect to service reward.…”