Strategic exploitation with learning and heterogeneous beliefs

Agbo, Maxime

doi:10.1016/j.jeem.2013.11.007

Cited by 5 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 45 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…See Appendix 7.5. Proposition 4 is in line with the results in the literature, where it is shown that the risk generated from anticipated learning induces precautionary behavior, which in our context translates into emissions reductions; see, e.g., Agbo (2014). Further, it has been shown that uncertainty leads to emissions reduction due to risk considerations (see, e.g., Baker (2005) and Bramoullé and Treich (2009)).…”

Section: Proposition 4 Total Emissions Are Lower Under Learning Than supporting

confidence: 90%

“…When there is heterogeneity among the players, the ordering might be reversed, i.e., e (10) and (14), we have the following equivalence: (17) where the numerator is the weighted self-precautionary effect due to the additional uncertainty generated by anticipated learning, and the denominator measures the same effect for all other players. This effect for all other players is referred to as differential informational externality in Agbo (2014). The inequality in (17) can be rearranged as…”

Section: Proposition 4 Total Emissions Are Lower Under Learning Than mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Our model has its root in two literature streams, i.e., uncertainty and learning and dynamic games of pollution emissions. More precisely, our uncertainty and learning setup is in line with the framework considered in Koulovatianos et al (2009), Agbo (2014) and Mirman and Santugini (2014). Koulovatianos et al (2009) is an optimal-growth model, that is, no strategic interactions are involved.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Koulovatianos et al (2009) is an optimal-growth model, that is, no strategic interactions are involved. Agbo (2014) and Mirman and Santugini (2014) extend the Great Fish War dynamic game to a learning environment. Specifically, Agbo (2014) considers the effect of learning in the context of a strategic exploitation of a natural resources whereas Mirman and Santugini (2014) study the effect of multiple source of learning when agents not only extract a resource for consumption, but also invest in technology to improve the future stock.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

A Dynamic Game of Emissions Pollution with Uncertainty and Learning

Masoudi

Santugini

Zaccour

2015

Environ Resource Econ

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract:We introduce learning in a dynamic game of international pollution, with ecological uncertainty. We characterize and compare the feedback non-cooperative emissions strategies of players when the players do not know the distribution of ecological uncertainty but they gain information (learn) about it. We then compare our learning model with the benchmark model of full information, where players know the distribution of ecological uncertainty. We find that uncertainty due to anticipative learning induces a decrease in total emissions, but not necessarily in individual emissions. Further, the effect of structural uncertainty on total and individual emissions depends on the beliefs distribution and bias. Moreover, we obtain that if a player's beliefs change toward more optimistic views or if she feels that the situation is less risky, then she increases her emissions while others react to this change and decrease their emissions.

show abstract

Section: Proposition 4 Total Emissions Are Lower Under Learning Than supporting

confidence: 90%

Section: Proposition 4 Total Emissions Are Lower Under Learning Than mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

A Dynamic Game of Emissions Pollution with Uncertainty and Learning

Masoudi

Santugini

Zaccour

2015

Environ Resource Econ

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Antoniadou et al (2013) and Agbo (2014) consider exogenous uncertainty in stock dynamics . Fesselmeyer and Santugini (2013) consider exogenous uncertainty in the quality of the resource as well as the probability of regime shifts in the growth rate of the stock.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Rise and Fall of the Great Fish Pact Under Endogenous Risk of Stock Collapse

Walker

Weikard²,

Richter

2015

SSRN Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Risk of stock collapse is a genuine motivation for cooperative fisheries management. We analyse the effect of an endogenously determined risk of stock collapse on the incentives to cooperate in a Great Fish War model. We establish that equilibrium harvest strategies are nonlinear in stock and find that Grand Coalitions can be stable for any number of players if freeriding results in a total depletion of the fish stock. The results thus show conditions under which a Great Fish War becomes a Great Fish Pact. However, this conclusion no longer holds upon dropping the standard assumption that payoffs are evaluated in steady states. If payoffs in the transition between steady states are included, the increased incentives to deviate offset the increased benefits from cooperation due to the presence of endogenous risk and the Great Fish Pact returns to being a Great Fish War.

show abstract

Strategic Exploitation of a Common-Property Resource Under Rational Learning About its Reproduction

Koulovatianos

2014

Dyn Games Appl

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We build a workable game of common-property resource extraction under rational Bayesian learning about the reproduction prospects of a resource. We focus on Markov-perfect strategies under truthful revelation of beliefs. For reasonable initial conditions, exogenously shifting the prior beliefs of one player towards more pessimism about the potential of natural resources to reproduce, can create anti-conservation incentives. The single player whose beliefs have been shifted towards more pessimism exhibits higher exploitation rate than before. In response, all other players reduce their exploitation rates in order to conserve the resource. However, the overall conservation incentive is weak, making the aggregate exploitation rate higher than before the pessimistic shift in beliefs of that single player. Due to this weakness in strategic conservation responses, if the number of players is relatively small, then in cases with common priors, jointly shifting all players'beliefs towards more pessimism exacerbates the commons problem.

show abstract

Strategic exploitation with learning and heterogeneous beliefs

Cited by 5 publications

References 45 publications

A Dynamic Game of Emissions Pollution with Uncertainty and Learning

A Dynamic Game of Emissions Pollution with Uncertainty and Learning

The Rise and Fall of the Great Fish Pact Under Endogenous Risk of Stock Collapse

Strategic Exploitation of a Common-Property Resource Under Rational Learning About its Reproduction

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About