A Dynamic Game of Emissions Pollution with Uncertainty and Learning

Abstract

Abstract:We introduce learning in a dynamic game of international pollution, with ecological uncertainty. We characterize and compare the feedback non-cooperative emissions strategies of players when the players do not know the distribution of ecological uncertainty but they gain information (learn) about it. We then compare our learning model with the benchmark model of full information, where players know the distribution of ecological uncertainty. We find that uncertainty due to anticipative learning induces a decrease in total emissions, but not necessarily in individual emissions. Further, the effect of structural uncertainty on total and individual emissions depends on the beliefs distribution and bias. Moreover, we obtain that if a player's beliefs change toward more optimistic views or if she feels that the situation is less risky, then she increases her emissions while others react to this change and decrease their emissions.

Promotion strategies for environmentally friendly packaging: a stochastic differential game perspective

“…Equation 3 models a stochastic differential equation to characterize the uncertainty of , which is influenced by several unpredictable factors (Athanassoglou and Xepapadeas 2012 ; Masoudi et al. 2016 ).…”