“…Despite the conceptual confusion in some empirical cases, strategic hedging is clearly distinct from soft balancing in significant respects: (i) While soft balancing is equally attractive for second‐tier states in both concentrating and deconcentrating unipolar systems, strategic hedging is more attractive under deconcentrating unipolar conditions that involve more possibility of sharing the spoils with the system; (ii) The hedging state is willing to suffer additional temporary costs in the present to better prepare for the future; (iii) Most importantly, strategic hedging addresses a wider range of both military and nonmilitary strategies, and has much stronger connection to system structure than soft balancing (Tessman & Wolfe, , p. 220); and (iv) Second‐tier states usually resort to soft balancing as a result of conflicting foreign policy interests with the system leader, while strategic hedging has a coherent long‐term plan aimed at developing economic and military capabilities while avoiding direct confrontation with this leader (Tessman, ). The concept of strategic hedging draws on the works of, that is, Medeiros (/), Foot (), Goldstein (), Goh (/2008), Tessman and Wolfe (), Tessman (), Salman and Geeraerts () and provides a theoretical model for analyzing the foreign policy behavior of “second‐tier” states toward a systemically dominant actor in the international system. In a situation of uncertainty about future developments, intentions, or foreign policy reactions of this dominant actor, second‐tier states opt to strategically hedge against potential risks arising from their foreign policies.…”