Strategic Implications for (Non-Equity) Alliance Performance

Gudergan, Siegfried P.; Devinney, Timothy M.; Richter, Nicole; Ellis, Rob

doi:10.1016/j.lrp.2012.09.002

Cited by 36 publications

(18 citation statements)

References 150 publications

(166 reference statements)

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“…Prior studies measure firm capabilities using two distinct methods. The first research stream uses surveys or interviews to examine managers’ perceptions about their firms’ capabilities (Gudergan et al, ; McEvily and Chakravarthy, ). The benefit of this perceptional measure is that it can help researchers identify the different types of capabilities possessed by each firm.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Institutions and Foreign Subsidiary Growth in Transition Economies: The Role of Intangible Assets and Capabilities

Kafouros

Aliyev

2015

J Management Studies

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Institutions and foreign subsidiary growth in transition economies:The role of intangible assets and capabilities ABSTRACTAlthough transition economies experience significant institutional transformations that vary in their degree and pace, scholarly knowledge of what distinguishes more successful foreign subsidiaries from less successful ones in such environments is limited and inconsistent. We enhance the understanding of this subject by examining how variations in the institutional development of transition economies influence the usefulness of a subsidiary's intangible assets and capabilities and, in turn, their effectiveness in enhancing its growth. Prior research assumes that foreign subsidiaries that operate in any given environment are always better off when they possess strong intangible assets and capabilities. Our analysis of more than 33,000 observations in 14 transition economies challenges this view and enables us to explain why some subsidiaries grow more quickly in less-developed institutional environments, whereas others more quickly in countries with institutions that are more developed. More specifically, we show that although a subsidiary's intangible assets enhance its growth in transition economies with stronger institutions, these effects are particularly weak or insignificant in transition countries with less developed institutional environments. Conversely, a completely different pattern emerges for subsidiary capabilities, with their marginal effects on subsidiary growth being significantly higher in countries that are institutionally less developed than in transition countries with more developed institutions.

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Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Institutions and Foreign Subsidiary Growth in Transition Economies: The Role of Intangible Assets and Capabilities

Kafouros

Aliyev

2015

J Management Studies

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“…Earlier studies have typically examined relatively broad categories of governance, like equity versus non-equity arrangements (e.g., Gudergan et al, 2003;Lui and Ngo, 2004;Wang and Nicholas, 2007) or alliances as a form of governance as opposed to mergers and acquisitions (e.g., Hagedoorn, 1993). In this study, however, we contribute to the literature that examines the factors that explain how such organisational forms emerge (e.g., Nielsen, 2003;Ouchi, 1979Ouchi, , 1980Ouchi and Johnson, 1978;White and Lui, 2005) and how a firm's use of certain levels of complexity in their contractual agreement affects the particular organisational form in an alliance.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Contractual complexity, governance and organisational form in alliances

Schweitzer

Gudergan

2011

IJSBA

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Contracting and governance related issues are critical for the success of alliances. In this paper, we provide a theoretical framework to describe the role of the contractual complexity of alliance agreements for the governance and organisational form of alliances. We suggest control theory to explain how the goal incongruence and performance ambiguity among collaborating partners, in conjunction with the complexity of their contractual agreements, affect the organisational form of alliances that can be characterised as bureaucracy, market, clan, or adhocracy. Our framework implies that managers who review and control contractual complexity, goal incongruence, and performance ambiguity, will be able to identify and employ governance for their alliances that better supports their firm's strategic intentions.

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“…For an overview of the methodology see Chin (1998), Hair et al (2011), and Lohmöller (1989; and for some illustrative applications in strategic management see Birkinshaw et al (1995), Johansson and Yip (1994), Robins et al (2002) and Gudergan et al (2012).…”

Section: Methods Of Estimationmentioning

confidence: 99%

How Contracts and Culture Mediate Joint Transactions of Innovation Partnerships

Schweitzer

2016

Int. J. Innov. Mgt.

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Although the literature suggests that matters of contracting and governance in strategic innovation partnerships are interrelated and that governance of partnerships generally occurs with contractual heterogeneity, our understanding about the specific relationships between contracting and the partnership culture that facilitates joint transactions is rather vague. In this study, we clarify how the complexity of contractual agreements between partners in conjunction with the alignment of their innovation objectives and the ambiguity inherent in their mutual contributions to the partnership can be used to predict the culture of the partnership. We find that innovation partnerships result to be one of four types: bureaucratic, market, clan, or adhocracy. Our result emphasises the central role of contractual complexity as a suitable and relevant concept to capture the nature of interorganisational innovation partnerships.

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Strategic Implications for (Non-Equity) Alliance Performance

Cited by 36 publications

References 150 publications

Institutions and Foreign Subsidiary Growth in Transition Economies: The Role of Intangible Assets and Capabilities

Institutions and Foreign Subsidiary Growth in Transition Economies: The Role of Intangible Assets and Capabilities

Contractual complexity, governance and organisational form in alliances

How Contracts and Culture Mediate Joint Transactions of Innovation Partnerships

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