Strategic information revelation when experts compete to influence

Bhattacharya, Sourav; Mukherjee, Arijit

doi:10.1111/1756-2171.12029

Cited by 61 publications

(18 citation statements)

References 38 publications

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“…From the receiver's point of view, two senders who are biased in the same direction are preferable to two senders biased in different directions. A similar result regarding the preference of the receiver over the biases of the senders in the verifiable messages literature is found in the recent work of Bhattacharya and Mukherjee (2013). However, these results stem from different sources.…”

Section: Theorem 2 With Opposed Biases (I) the Most Informative Monsupporting

confidence: 82%

“…However, these results stem from different sources. In Bhattacharya and Mukherjee (2013), the senders do not always know the true state of the world, and having senders who are similarly biased increases the chance of a sender existing who both knows the true state of the world and has an incentive to inform the receiver. In the model of the current paper, the result stems from the fact that there exists an outcome of the messaging protocol, 'block', which can be induced by either of the senders.…”

Section: Theorem 2 With Opposed Biases (I) the Most Informative Monmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Cheap Talk and Editorial Control

Newton

2014

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics

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This paper analyzes simple models of editorial control. Starting from the framework developed by Krishna and Morgan (2001a), we analyze 2-sender models of cheap talk where one or more of the senders has the power to veto messages before they reach the receiver. A characterization of the most informative equilibria of such models is given. It is shown that editorial control never aids communication and that for small biases in the senders' preferences relative to those of the receiver, necessary and sufficient conditions for information transmission to be adversely affected are (i) that the senders have opposed preferences relative to the receiver, and (ii) that both senders have powers of editorial control. It is shown that the addition of further senders beyond two weakly decreases information transmission when senders exercising editorial control are anonymous, and weakly increases information transmission when senders exercising editorial control are observed.

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Section: Theorem 2 With Opposed Biases (I) the Most Informative Monsupporting

confidence: 82%

Section: Theorem 2 With Opposed Biases (I) the Most Informative Monmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cheap Talk and Editorial Control

Newton

2014

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics

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“…5 Finally, an example where commitment does not help in a disclosure game is included in Bhattacharya and Mukherjee (2013).…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Evidence Games: Truth and Commitment

Hart

Kremer²,

Perry³

2017

American Economic Review

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for useful comments and discussions. We also thank the anonymous referees and the editor for their very careful reading and helpful comments and suggestions. AbstractAn evidence game is a strategic disclosure game in which an informed agent who has some pieces of verifiable evidence decides which ones to disclose to an uninformed principal who chooses a reward. The agent, regardless of his information, prefers the reward to be as high as possible. We compare the setup in which the principal chooses the reward after the evidence is disclosed to the mechanism-design setup where he can commit in advance to a reward policy, and show that under natural conditions related to the evidence structure and the inherent prominence of truth, the two setups yield the same outcome.

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“…9 Experts with identical agendas can be better for the principal than experts with opposing agendas in the persuasion model of Bhattacharya and Mukherjee (2013). The mechanism is rather different than in our paper, though: with similar experts an undesirable default action can provide strong incentives for both experts to reveal information.…”

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confidence: 68%

A Delegation-Based Theory of Expertise

Ambrus

Baranovskyi²,

Kolb

2015

SSRN Journal

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We investigate competition in a delegation framework, with a coarsely informed principal. Two imperfectly informed and biased experts simultaneously propose action choices. A principal with a diffuse prior, and only being able to ordinally compare the two proposals, has to choose one of them. The selected expert might receive a bonus payment. We show that having a second expert benefits the principal, even if the two experts have the same biases and the bonus of the winner is zero. In contrast with other models of expertise, in our setting the principal prefers experts with equal rather than opposite biases. Increasing the bonus brings experts closer to truthful reporting, but this only benefits the principal up to a threshold level, with further increases in the bonus strictly decreasing her payoffs. A methodological contribution of our paper is characterizing restrictions on the set of strategies which allows a formal generalization of ex ante expected payoffs to games with diffuse prior.

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Strategic information revelation when experts compete to influence

Cited by 61 publications

References 38 publications

Cheap Talk and Editorial Control

Cheap Talk and Editorial Control

Evidence Games: Truth and Commitment

A Delegation-Based Theory of Expertise

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