Strategic instruments: legal structure and political games in administrative law

Tiller, Emerson H.; Spiller, Pablo T.

doi:10.1093/jleo/15.2.349

Cited by 81 publications

(46 citation statements)

References 22 publications

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“…If they locate their decisions within this area, they escape review. Tiller and Spiller (1999) analyze a model in which a court may choose among diff erent grounds on which to rest a decision. Some instruments provide greater protection from reversal and the lower court chooses strategically.…”

Section: Doctrinementioning

confidence: 99%

“…For each group of cases, she then regresses the size of the yearly Supreme Court budget on the divergence between the judicial and Congressional liberality ratings; she fi nds a statistically signifi cant pattern, with the budget rising when Supreme Court opinions conform more closely to the views of Congress. She then regresses the liberality of the judicial portfolio against the Supreme Court budget, the parameter of which is also statistically signifi cant Spiller and Tiller (1997), Tiller (1998) and Tiller and Spiller (1999) study the extent of review adopted by the court. The court has preferences over policies and costs of review.…”

Section: Models Of Adjudication Embedded In a Constitutional Systemmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Appeal and supreme courts

Kornhauser¹

2017

Encyclopedia of Law and Economics

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Section: Doctrinementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Models Of Adjudication Embedded In a Constitutional Systemmentioning

confidence: 99%

Appeal and supreme courts

Kornhauser¹

2017

Encyclopedia of Law and Economics

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“…Indeed, to our knowledge, there have been only a handful of attempts (e.g., Caldeira, Wright, and Zorn 1999;Eskridge 1991aEskridge , 1991bSchwartz 1992Schwartz , 1996Ferejohn and Weingast 1992a;Tiller and Spiller 1999). But those that do exist well illustrate the power of the approach.…”

Section: Undertaking Formal Equilibnium Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

Toward a Strategic Revolution in Judicial Politics: A Look Back, A Look Ahead

Epstein¹,

Knight²

2000

Political Research Quarterly

139

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As papers presented at recent disciplinary conferences and articles published in major political science journals reveal, the field of judicial politics is undergoing a sea change. Variants of the social-psychological paradigm, which have long dominated thinking about law and courts, are giving way to approaches grounded in assumptions in rationality. More to the point, ever-growing numbers of scholars are now invoking the strategic account to understand judicial politics. In what follows, we investigate this "strategic revolution." We begin by providing an intellectual history of the field, with special emphasis on why judicial specialists resisted strategic analysis for so long and why they are now (re)turning to it in ever-increasing numbers. Next, we consider the ways that analysts have begun to put the strategic account to work. This is an important task, for debates are already emerging over the "best" way to invoke the account to study judicial politics. We take the position that there is no one "right" way but rather four different approaches-all of which have the potential to provide us with important insights into law and courts.

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“…Thus, the executive and legislative branches are not only interested in their own decision outcomes, but also on whether their decisions will trigger the judiciary to move and reverse such decisions. See, amongst others, the papers of Ferejohn and Shipan (1990), McNollGast (1990), Gely and Spiller (1990), Spiller and Spitzer (1992), Ferejohn and Weingast (1992) and Tiller and Spiller (1999).…”

Section: Political Economy Models Of the Judiciarymentioning

confidence: 99%

Judges and Taxes: Judicial Review, Judicial Independence and the Size of Government

Tridmas

2005

Constit Polit Econ

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The study investigates how judicial review of policy and judicial independence affect the relative size of government. Judicial oversight of policy is the authority of courts to check the legality of policy measures and annul measures which are incompatible with the constitution or are enacted without following the procedures laid down by the law. Using a model of constitutional political economy, where policy making is subject to judicial oversight, it is predicted that the relative size of the public sector decreases as judicial review and judicial independence increase. The theoretical predictions are tested in an international cross section sample of 52 countries. Controlling for the effects of real income, age dependency, openness of the economy, the legal origins of a country and other socio-political variables the results show that the checks and balances provided by the judiciary lead to a smaller relative size of taxes in the economy. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2005size of government, taxation, judicial review, judicial independence,

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Strategic instruments: legal structure and political games in administrative law

Cited by 81 publications

References 22 publications

Appeal and supreme courts

Appeal and supreme courts

Toward a Strategic Revolution in Judicial Politics: A Look Back, A Look Ahead

Judges and Taxes: Judicial Review, Judicial Independence and the Size of Government

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