Strategic investments with spillovers, vertical integration and foreclosure in the broadband access market

Foros, Øystein

doi:10.1016/s0167-7187(03)00079-1

Cited by 122 publications

(110 citation statements)

References 22 publications

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“…Consequently, the MNO may face lower returns from its investments. Foros (2004), Woroch (2004), and Kotakorpi (2006), among others, forwarded this argument. Griliches (1992) emphasized that investment spillovers are different from knowledge spillovers.…”

Section: Investment Spilloversmentioning

confidence: 96%

“…For example, a part of the spillover may be recovered if the MVNOs can afford a higher access fee charged by the MNO. Foros (2004) showed that without access-price regulation and with a competitive downstream sector, a vertically integrated firm has an incentive to invest because its downstream rival is more efficient in offering services. Similarly, Kotakorpi (2006) showed that without access-price regulation, investment spillovers may positively affect investment because an incumbent makes profit in the access market.…”

Section: Investment Spilloversmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The experiences and lessons from unbundling illustrate the advantages and disadvantages of access regulation. Two reasons explain decreased MNO investments when MVNOs access MNO networks: externalities of investment (Foros, 2004;Kotakorpi, 2006) and asymmetric risk sharing.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The MNOs cannot appropriate all the rents from their investments. Therefore, access regulation undermines MNO incentives for investment and results in lower MNO investment (Foros, 2004;Woroch, 2004;Kotakorpi, 2006). Second, access regulation involves asymmetric risk sharing between the MNOs that provide access and MVNOs (Pindyck, 2004;Guthrie, 2006).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

Access regulation and infrastructure investment in the mobile telecommunications industry

Kim

Gaston

et al. 2011

Telecommunications Policy

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Section: Investment Spilloversmentioning

confidence: 96%

Section: Investment Spilloversmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Access regulation and infrastructure investment in the mobile telecommunications industry

Kim

Gaston

et al. 2011

Telecommunications Policy

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“…Vareda (2007) studies the incumbent's incentives to invest in quality upgrades and cost reduction when the regulator forces it to unbundle its network. Foros (2004) shows that under some conditions the investment by an incumbent in the quality of its network is lower with price regulation since the access price is set equal to marginal cost. Kotakorpi (2006) The remainder of the article is organized as follows.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Incentives to Invest and to Give Access to Non-Regulated Next Generation Networks

Brito

Pereira²,

Vareda

2008

SSRN Journal

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We analyze the incentives of a telecommunications incumbent to invest and give access to a downstream entrant to a next generation network, NGN. We model the industry as a duopoly, where a vertically integrated incumbent and a downstream entrant, that requires access to the incumbent's network, compete on Hotelling's line. The incumbent can invest in the deployment of a NGN that improves the quality of the retail services. Access to the old network is regulated, but access to the NGN is not.If the innovation is drastic, the incumbent always invests in the NGN, but does not give access to the entrant. If the innovation is non-drastic and if the access price to the old network is low, the incumbent voluntarily gives access to the NGN. If the innovation is non-drastic, there is no monotonic relation between the access price to the old network and the incumbent's incentives to invest. A regulatory moratorium emerges as socially optimal, if the innovation is large but non-drastic. We also analyze the case where both …rms can invest in the deployment of a NGN.

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Some Unintended Consequences of Parallel Trade in Pharmaceuticals

Matteucci

Reverberi

2014

Manage. Decis. Econ.

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It is widely argued that international arbitrage, or parallel trade (PT), in patented drugs may increase consumer surplus in the relevant countries but at the expense of R&D investment. We show how the effects of PT depend on the vertical contract (linear pricing or dual pricing) between the manufacturer and the foreign licensee or distributor and on whether and how drug prices are regulated and reimbursed. We find that, contrary to what policy makers generally predict, we should be more concerned with the impact of PT on aggregate consumer surplus than on R&D investment.

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Strategic investments with spillovers, vertical integration and foreclosure in the broadband access market

Cited by 122 publications

References 22 publications

Access regulation and infrastructure investment in the mobile telecommunications industry

Access regulation and infrastructure investment in the mobile telecommunications industry

Incentives to Invest and to Give Access to Non-Regulated Next Generation Networks

Some Unintended Consequences of Parallel Trade in Pharmaceuticals

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