Strategic price discounting and rationing in uniform price auctions

Bourjade, Sylvain

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2009.05.008

Cited by 7 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 53 publications

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“…On the other hand, uniform pricing is simple, and provides "fairness" to bidders and promotes aggressive bidding [24]. However, uniform pricing is suspect to collusion among the bidders [6] and for an unsettled market, it might be more dangerous with respect to the amount of revenue it generates [24]. Because of these complex factors, we leave the choice of pricing model to auctioneers, and focus on designing efficient bidding language and fast clearing-algorithms for both models.…”

Section: Background On Auctionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Towards real-time dynamic spectrum auctions

et al. 2008

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In this paper, we propose a low-complexity auction framework to distribute spectrum in real-time among a large number of wireless users with dynamic traffic. Our design consists of a compact and highly-expressive bidding format, two pricing models to control tradeoffs between revenue and fairness, and fast auction clearing algorithms to achieve conflict-free spectrum allocations that maximize auction revenue. We develop analytical bounds on algorithm performance and complexity to verify the efficiency of the proposed approach. We also use both simulated and real deployment traces to evaluate the auction framework. We conclude that pricing models and bidding behaviors have significant impact on auction outcomes and spectrum utilization. Any efficient spectrum auction system must consider demand and spectrum availability in local regions to maximize system-wide revenue and spectrum utilization.

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Section: Background On Auctionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Towards real-time dynamic spectrum auctions

et al. 2008

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“…Recently, scholars focused on the study on comparison between the uniform-price auction and the discriminatory auction. Bourjade (2009) modified the uniform-price auction rules in allowing the seller to ration bidders and proved that this rules provide a strategic foundation for underpricing when the seller has an interest in ownership dispersion and then many of the so-called "collusive-seeming" equilibria disappear. Brenner et al (2009) investigated the revealed preferences of the issuers by surveying the sovereign issuers that conduct auctions and found that the majority of the issuers/countries in our sample use a discriminatory auction mechanism for issuing government debt, and they also concluded that market-oriented eco-nomies and those that practice common law tend to use a uniform method while economies who are less market oriented and practice civil law tend to use discriminatory price auctions.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Uniform Price Auction of Divisible Goods Based on Multiple Rounds Linear Bidding and Its Equilibrium Analysis

Rao

Zhao

Chen

2014

Technological and Economic Development of Economy

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In this paper, the auction problem of a kind of continuous homogeneous divisible goods is studied and a uniform price auction mechanism is presented based on three conditions, i.e. the auctioneer’s supply is variable, every bidder submits multiple rounds continuous linear bidding, and every bidder’s valuation to per unit of the goods is independent private information. Concretely, two key problems, i.e. the bidders’ asymptotic strategic behaviours and forming process and composition of equilibrium points are explored. The conclusion is drawn that different bidders’ bidding order and different starting points of initial bidding would not cause different local equilibrium points, and if the equilibrium points exist, then the equilibrium point is unique.

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