Strategic trade in pollution permits

Dickson, Alexander; MacKenzie, Ian A.

doi:10.1016/j.jeem.2017.04.009

Cited by 19 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 33 publications

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“…Substituting this into agent i's …rst order condition (B3), we see that it is the same as his …rst order condition (21) with EML by (22). Thus z i = y i when v i = q N i given by (12).…”

Section: With Eml We …Ndmentioning

confidence: 85%

Pareto-Efficient Solutions for Shared Public Good Provision: Nash Bargaining versus Exchange-Matching-Lindahl

Dijkstra

Nentjes

2020

Resource and Energy Economics

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Section: With Eml We …Ndmentioning

confidence: 85%

Pareto-Efficient Solutions for Shared Public Good Provision: Nash Bargaining versus Exchange-Matching-Lindahl

Dijkstra

Nentjes

2020

Resource and Energy Economics

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“…Our results also complement ongoing research on policy instruments for control of multiple pollutants. Earlier studies-although focusing mainly on the interplay between greenhouse gases and air pollutants-have, for example, identified that strategic corporate behaviour in emission permit markets might lead to cost inefficiencies (Dickson and MacKenzie 2018). It is also identified that the choice between an emission tax and permit instruments on different pollutants in a multi-pollutant system might have welfare impacts, where the key determinant is whether the pollutants are complements or substitutes (Ambec and Coria 2013;Fullerton and Karney 2018).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Investment perspectives on costs for air pollution control affect the optimal use of emission control measures

Åström

Kiesewetter

Schöpp

et al. 2018

Clean Techn Environ Policy

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Cost-effective air pollution emission control has been in focus for decades in international air pollution regulations. Despite large observed emission reductions for many air pollutants, environmental and human health problems persist and more efforts are needed. However, some stakeholders are concerned that the costs for remaining emission control measures are prohibitively high. There are several reasons for concern, and one can be the difference in investment perspectives-i.e. costs of borrowing and time constraints-held by stakeholders. By using the integrated assessment model GAINS, we study whether differences in investment perspectives of Nordic stakeholders influence measures selected for cost-effective emission control and can motivate concerns for high costs of emission control. We distinguish the control cost calculations between a social planner perspective and a corporate perspective and apply these to the GAINS model database on emission control measures. A cost-minimized selection of measures in 2030 is then calculated for increasing environmental and health ambitions for both perspectives. The results show an irregular pattern, but for a range of ambition levels the corporate perspective affects the selection of measures and implies surplus costs for the Nordic social planner of up to 120 million € per year. This is 36% more expensive than the costs of the social planners' selection. Conversely, from a corporate perspective the social planners' selection can imply cost increases of up to 180 million €. We therefore suggest that control of investment perspective effects should be standard in analysis of cost-effective air pollution measures.

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“…Chaabane [29] and Haita [30] discuss and construct the model for the emission trading scheme. Dickson [31] established a two-stage framework for emissions trading. Carmona [32] designed the market for emission trading.…”

Section: Research On International Forestry Carbon Sequestration and Trade Of Other Pollutantsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Design of Combined Auction Model for Emission Rights of International Forestry Carbon Sequestration and Other Pollutants Based on SMRA

Guo

Hua

et al. 2021

Sustainability

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In this paper, the combined transactions for emission rights of international carbon sequestration and other pollutants in forestry have been taken as the research object, and the Simultaneous Multiple Round Auction (SMRA) theory has been used to design a new model for the current auction transactions. In this paper, the feasibility and application of the SMRA model of reach object are studied by the methods of simulation experiment, model analysis, and analogical analysis, and the promotion of this model is discussed. The results show that the new auction model designed in this paper fills in the blank of the combined auction of international forestry carbon sequestration and other pollutant emission rights. It successfully eliminates the winners’ curse and the losses of the sellers. Meanwhile, it provides a new way of resolving ecological deficits problems, achieving the ultimate goal of an overall reduction in carbon and pollution emission. Moreover, it’s beneficial in resolving the structural contradictions between ecological purification and pollutants discharge, hence maximizing the benefits for all the stakeholders. Finally, it is suggested that the SMRA should be adopted in the international trading of emission rights of international carbon sequestration and other pollutants to promote the emission reduction of greenhouse gases and pollutants.

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Strategic trade in pollution permits

Cited by 19 publications

References 33 publications

Pareto-Efficient Solutions for Shared Public Good Provision: Nash Bargaining versus Exchange-Matching-Lindahl

Pareto-Efficient Solutions for Shared Public Good Provision: Nash Bargaining versus Exchange-Matching-Lindahl

Investment perspectives on costs for air pollution control affect the optimal use of emission control measures

Design of Combined Auction Model for Emission Rights of International Forestry Carbon Sequestration and Other Pollutants Based on SMRA

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