Strategies for applying carbon trading to the new energy vehicle market in China: An improved evolutionary game analysis for the bus industry

Nie, Qingyun; Zhang, Lihui; Tong, Zihao; Hubacek, Klaus

doi:10.1016/j.energy.2022.124904

Cited by 29 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 81 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…For instance, Nie et al (2022) explored the interaction between purchasing decisions made by public transportation operators and government policy implementation decisions within the framework of carbon trading subsidy policies. They sought to identify stable strategies for all parties involved through advancements in evolutionary game theory [ 15 ]. Tian and Sun (2022) delved into the intricate dynamics among producers, regulatory agencies, third-party certification agencies, and consumers, employing a four-party evolutionary game model to elucidate their evolutionary paths and stable strategies [ 16 ].…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The evolution of multi-agent low-carbon transition has received significant attention, and scholars have conducted extensive discussions and analyses, resulting in many valuable research findings. Among them, most studies adopt the evolutionary game theory approach by constructing evolutionary game models to study the evolutionary paths and patterns of decision-making by the agents [ 15 – 20 ]. Evolutionary game theory, as a dynamic theory of the evolution of collective characteristics based on individual learning and selection in the interaction process, has become an essential tool for studying the agents’ decision-making evolution mechanisms.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Low-carbon energy transition multi-agent network evolutionary under carbon trading scheme

Wei,

Wang,

Fang

et al. 2024

PLoS ONE

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Transitioning to low-carbon energy is key for reaching carbon neutrality and modernizing our energy systems, but it presents significant cost-related challenges for energy businesses. To foster optimal outcomes, this paper develops a game model including power generators, high-energy businesses, and consumers in the carbon trading framework. The model explores how different entities evolve their low-carbon strategies under social learning influence to optimize utility. Stability analysis of strategy and simulation experiments reveal the following findings: (1) Greater carbon quotas reduce power generators’ low-carbon transition willingness while high-energy-consuming enterprises and consumers remain unchanged. (2) Higher prices for low-carbon products offered by high-energy-consuming enterprises boost low-carbon transition motivation across all parties. (3) Increased green premiums enhance revenue for all parties but are constrained by policy and carbon pricing. (4) Both direct and indirect increases in carbon emissions negatively impact the revenue and utility for all stakeholders. (5) Increasing social learning effect fosters a shift towards low-carbon strategies, accelerating the attainment of game equilibrium, and enhancing market stability and sustainability. This research provides decision support for carbon trading policy design and low-carbon transition of energy enterprises.

show abstract

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Low-carbon energy transition multi-agent network evolutionary under carbon trading scheme

Wei,

Wang,

Fang

et al. 2024

PLoS ONE

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Scholars begin to focus on the application of the evolutionary game theory to carbon trading downstream. Nie et al (2022) apply the carbon trading subsidy (CTS) to the bus industry and solve the issue of the interaction between the purchase decision of bus operators and the decision implementation of the government through the improved evolutionary game model. Zhao et al (2021) construct an evolutionary game model among the government, financial institutions, and consumers and analyze the incentive effect of personal carbon accounts on household energy consumption and emission reduction.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary game equilibrium in the downstream carbon market: Evidence from the household size in China

Han

Jin

2023

Manage Decis Econ

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Carbon trading downstream, as a key strategy for decreasing carbon emissions, has the potential to hasten the entire society's decarbonization. Taking the government, household, and carbon trading management center as stakeholders, this paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model, examines and stimulates evolutionary stability strategies, and then proposes some policy implications. Findings show that the downstream carbon market faces a complex evolutionary process. The promotion of the policy can be split into two periods: policy promotion and policy stability implementation. And proper household size management is a crucial and effective strategy to encourage downstream carbon trading programs and emission reduction.

show abstract

“…In the production and service process of marine ranching enterprises, selecting a zero-carbon production strategy (carbon emissions = carbon sinks) will increase production costs and decrease profit margins, whereas selecting a non-zero-carbon production strategy (carbon emissions > carbon sinks) will reduce production costs and increase profit margins. Under limited government oversight, marine ranching companies may choose non-zero carbon production strategies and rent from third-party testing agencies in order to obtain low-carbon subsidies and avoid high-carbon emission fines (Nie et al, 2022). Interest-driven third-party testing agencies may choose intentional rent-seeking strategies, causing marine ranching enterprises to choose non-zerocarbon production strategies during the production process, thereby impeding their transition to a low-carbon footprint.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Tripartite evolutionary game analysis and simulation research on zero-carbon production supervision of marine ranching against a carbon-neutral background

Liang

Zhang²,

Yin³

et al. 2023

Front. Ecol. Evol.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

IntroductionTheoretically and practically, studying the zero-carbon production supervision of marine ranching is crucial to the attainment of my country’s fishery carbon peak and carbon neutral goals.MethodsThis study introduces a third-party detection agency to construct a tripartite evolutionary game model based on the possibility of problems such as a lack of government supervision and imperfect detection mechanisms, through an analysis of the evolution stability and evolution path of each participant’s strategy choice, the mechanism of each element’s influence on the tripartite strategy choice is revealed, as well as the evolution law of the tripartite game.Results① The change in strategic choice of each participant is significantly influenced by the change in strategic choice of the other participants, and the comprehensive consideration of the maximization of the comprehensive value of each participant is conducive to the development of all three parties. ② Government efforts to increase low-carbon subsidies and penalties will aid in promoting the normative behavior of zero-carbon production by marine ranching businesses and the rejection of rent-seeking by third parties. ③The accountability of higher-level governments for the dereliction of duty of regulatory agencies is particularly important to enhance the robustness of zero-carbon production of marine ranching enterprises.DiscussionIn this study, the ideal state of carbon balance of Marine ranching enterprises is taken as the condition to establish a tripartite evolutionary game, and the numerical simulation analysis results based on the model’s evolutionary stable equilibrium put forward countermeasures and suggestions for the government to improve the supervision mechanism of zero-carbon production of Marine ranching. In order to provide reference for the development of the marine ranching industry and promote the realization of zero emissions in the production activities of the marine ranching industry.

show abstract

Strategies for applying carbon trading to the new energy vehicle market in China: An improved evolutionary game analysis for the bus industry

Cited by 29 publications

References 81 publications

Low-carbon energy transition multi-agent network evolutionary under carbon trading scheme

Low-carbon energy transition multi-agent network evolutionary under carbon trading scheme

Evolutionary game equilibrium in the downstream carbon market: Evidence from the household size in China

Tripartite evolutionary game analysis and simulation research on zero-carbon production supervision of marine ranching against a carbon-neutral background

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About