Tripartite evolutionary game analysis and simulation research on zero-carbon production supervision of marine ranching against a carbon-neutral background

Abstract

IntroductionTheoretically and practically, studying the zero-carbon production supervision of marine ranching is crucial to the attainment of my country’s fishery carbon peak and carbon neutral goals.MethodsThis study introduces a third-party detection agency to construct a tripartite evolutionary game model based on the possibility of problems such as a lack of government supervision and imperfect detection mechanisms, through an analysis of the evolution stability and evolution path of each participant’s strategy choice, the mechanism of each element’s influence on the tripartite strategy choice is revealed, as well as the evolution law of the tripartite game.Results① The change in strategic choice of each participant is significantly influenced by the change in strategic choice of the other participants, and the comprehensive consideration of the maximization of the comprehensive value of each participant is conducive to the development of all three parties. ② Government efforts to increase low-carbon subsidies and penalties will aid in promoting the normative behavior of zero-carbon production by marine ranching businesses and the rejection of rent-seeking by third parties. ③The accountability of higher-level governments for the dereliction of duty of regulatory agencies is particularly important to enhance the robustness of zero-carbon production of marine ranching enterprises.DiscussionIn this study, the ideal state of carbon balance of Marine ranching enterprises is taken as the condition to establish a tripartite evolutionary game, and the numerical simulation analysis results based on the model’s evolutionary stable equilibrium put forward countermeasures and suggestions for the government to improve the supervision mechanism of zero-carbon production of Marine ranching. In order to provide reference for the development of the marine ranching industry and promote the realization of zero emissions in the production activities of the marine ranching industry.

Can energy saving and emission reduction policies promote green transformation of industrial enterprises——The Case of China

“…Currently, in the process of energy saving and emission reduction policies research, most of the studies focus on the analysis of the game behavior between the government and enterprises. Some studies also focus on establishing a three-party evolutionary game among enterprises, government, and verification agencies to examine the interactions and constraint mechanisms among these players [ 29 , 30 ]. Few studies have included the public as players in the game model and considered a comprehensive balance of interests in collaborative governance among governing subjects.…”

Can command-and-control policy drive low-carbon transition in energy-intensive enterprises? -a study based on evolutionary game theory

“…In this process, enterprises often replace traditional energy sources and optimize their production processes to promote a low-carbon transition (Pan and Dong, 2023;Yu et al, 2023). The ability of the verification agency to accurately verify a company's carbon emissions and report them truthfully to relevant authorities determines the success of low-carbon transformation efforts (Li Y. et al, 2023). Enterprises and verification agencies might conspire to pursue their benefits, resulting in obstacles to low-carbon transformation initiatives (Chen et al, 2023).…”

“…When an enterprise participates in the low-carbon transition, it can meet the carbon emission standard set by the government and pass the verification agency's verification; when an enterprise does not participate in the low-carbon transition, its carbon emission often exceeds the standard, then the enterprise bribes the verification agency to pass the verification. The bribery amount of the enterprise is B T , B T <(C L -C H ), and the enterprise also has falsifying behaviors such as falsifying production records and false propaganda (Liang et al, 2023), and the cost is C P .…”

The Effect of Marine Pastures on Green Aquaculture in China

“…At present, the relevant research studies on marine pasture in China are gradually becoming mature, from the hard environment to the soft environment, from the site selection of marine pasture [12,13], properties of algal reef materials [14,15], and spatial layout [16,17] to modern marine pasture construction [15], ecological security assessment [18][19][20], and research on the key technologies of marine pasture [21,22]; from the emphasis on economic benefits to the consideration of both economic and ecological benefits, the analysis of potential economic benefits [23,24] to ecological benefits [25,26], and the measurement of comprehensive benefits [27,28]. In recent years, with the "two mountains theory" and the "two-carbon target" successively proposed, the academic community has focused on topics such as carbon sinks in marine pastures and fisheries [29,30], most scholars have measured the blue carbon sink with marine shellfish and algae as objects [31,32], and some scholars have also started from carbon sink pricing and incentive subsidies [33,34].…”