2019
DOI: 10.1080/17449057.2019.1596467
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Strategies to Gain International Recognition: Iraqi Kurdistan's September 2017 Referendum for Independence

Abstract: Despite the growing interest in the study of de facto states, our understanding of the conditions under which these entities construct and change strategies to gain international recognition remains partial. The aim of this article is to answer the following questions: firstly, what strategies did the Kurdistan Region of Iraq adopt in its pursuit of international recognition? And secondly, what internal and external dynamics are responsible for changing these recognition strategies? To do so, we analyse 68 spe… Show more

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Cited by 10 publications
(9 citation statements)
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“…KDP and PUK immediately deployed their party‐affiliated peshmarga brigades to control those territories, including oil fields. These events escalated disagreements between Baghdad and Erbil over the status of peshmarga , revenue sharing, oil exportation, and the disputed territories (Palani et al., 2019a). During this period, Masoud Barzani took the first steps to push IKR for greater autonomy.…”
Section: Referendum and Multiple Visions For An Independent Kurdmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…KDP and PUK immediately deployed their party‐affiliated peshmarga brigades to control those territories, including oil fields. These events escalated disagreements between Baghdad and Erbil over the status of peshmarga , revenue sharing, oil exportation, and the disputed territories (Palani et al., 2019a). During this period, Masoud Barzani took the first steps to push IKR for greater autonomy.…”
Section: Referendum and Multiple Visions For An Independent Kurdmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The first one was promoted by KDP—mainly by Masoud Barzani—and its allies. This narrative focused on two major points: “the right to self‐determination” and the long historical failed partnership with Iraq, both of which created the right time for the referendum (Palani et al., 2019a, p. 16). On different occasions during the 2017 referendum campaign, Masoud Barzani recalled the historical genocides and crimes committed by pre‐2003 Iraqi regimes and insisted that the culture of using military force against Kurds has not changed in post‐2003 Iraq.…”
Section: Referendum and Multiple Visions For An Independent Kurdmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…They have both issued laws to manipulate political participation, especially the 1992 Electoral Law, which is still in force. They were also responsible for the civil war beginning in 1994, which "erupted due to a residue of past animosity dating back to the 1960s, disputes over land rights, conflict over revenues and disagreements over the 1992 election results" (Palani et al, 2019). It is also true that both "the KDP and PUK benefit from wealth coming from oil for patronage and consolidation of their power" (Palani et al, 2019).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…They were also responsible for the civil war beginning in 1994, which "erupted due to a residue of past animosity dating back to the 1960s, disputes over land rights, conflict over revenues and disagreements over the 1992 election results" (Palani et al, 2019). It is also true that both "the KDP and PUK benefit from wealth coming from oil for patronage and consolidation of their power" (Palani et al, 2019). Therefore, in 2006, Nawshirwan Mustafa established a reformist group within the PUK in an effort to transform the organization, fight corruption, bring about transparency, and build good governance in the Kurdistan Region (Hama, 2019a).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Erre a cikkre is jellemző azonban, hogy az Ankara és Erbíl közti kapcsolatoknak legin-kább csupán egyetlen momentumát ragadja kiez pedig leginkább az iraki kurdok 2017-es függetlenségi népszavazása. A legtöbb elemzés amúgy is ez utóbbival foglalkozik (Barzani 2013;Bengio 2019;Charountaki 2019;Dilek 2018;Gunter 2018;Gurbuz 2017;Kaplan 2019;McGinn 2018;Owtram 2017;Palani et al 2019a;Palani et al 2019b;Park 2018;Rafaat 2018;Riegl et al 2017;Strachota-Lang 2017;Tugdar 2019), és ehhez kapcsolódóan -többnyire csupán érintőlegesen -számol be a Törökország és a Kurdisztáni Autonóm Régió kapcsolatáról. A másik jellemző forráscsoportba azok az angol és török nyelvű tanulmányok tartoznak, amelyek az Iszlám Állam elleni harc miatt megnövekedett nemzetközi érdeklődés kielégítését szolgálják.…”
Section: Szakirodalmi áTtekintésunclassified