1979
DOI: 10.2307/589523
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Strikes, Industrial Relations and Class Conflict in Capitalist Societies

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Cited by 232 publications
(129 citation statements)
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“…While labour and the state were the key actors, just as in the past, the Irish and Italian social pacts were nonetheless very different from the old historical compromises of the 1930s when the unions strategically chose to shift their power from the industrial to the political arena and in so doing acquired the capacity to pursue broadly redistributive goals (Korpi and Shalev 1979). Even though they were not directly designed by business, the systemic consequences of the new pacts had few of the redistributive features generally associated with Scandinavian corporatism.…”
Section: The Theory Of Corporatism 701mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…While labour and the state were the key actors, just as in the past, the Irish and Italian social pacts were nonetheless very different from the old historical compromises of the 1930s when the unions strategically chose to shift their power from the industrial to the political arena and in so doing acquired the capacity to pursue broadly redistributive goals (Korpi and Shalev 1979). Even though they were not directly designed by business, the systemic consequences of the new pacts had few of the redistributive features generally associated with Scandinavian corporatism.…”
Section: The Theory Of Corporatism 701mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…En cuanto a la perspectiva política/organizativa, entre otros autores, Shorter y Tilly (1971 y 1974), Hibbs (1978), Korpi y Shalev (1979), Pizzorno (1978) y Cameron (1984, señalan que también es importante el uso de los «recursos de poder» en el esfera de la política. De este modo, las alteraciones en la intensidad de la actividad huelguística a medio y largo plazo pueden ser atribuidas a cambios en la localización de la lucha por la distribución de la renta de la esfera de la producción, donde la huelga es el principal mecanismo de presión, a la esfera de la política.…”
Section: Marco Analíticounclassified
“…De este modo, en países como Suecia, Noruega y Austria donde los partidos socialdemócratas habían sido los partidos dominantes en el Gobierno, los niveles de conflictividad experimentaron un declive a largo plazo, reflejo de que el conflicto por la distribución de la renta paso del mercado de trabajo a la esfera política. En el extremo opuesto, en países como Irlanda, Estados Unidos y Canadá donde la clase obrera nunca ha jugado un papel determinante en la política nacional, no se produjo tal declive (Korpi y Shalev, 1979;Korpi, 2002). Además, es algo más que una coincidencia que después de la exclusión de los socialdemócratas suecos del Gobierno a mediados los setenta hubiera un resurgimiento del conflicto industrial (Bean, 1985).…”
Section: Marco Analíticounclassified
“…However, redistributive policy-the politics of distribution as opposed to the politics of regulation-is different because the great majority of PR systems have governments based on bare majority class coalitions that control decisions about taxes and spending. This logic of exclusion and minimum winning coalitions is emphasized in Korpi and Shalev (1979), Huber and Stephens (2001), and Manow and Van Kersbergen (2009). For reasons explained in Iversen and Soskice (2006), coalition governments under PR tend to be center-left and redistributive, in contrast to median voter-oriented majoritarian systems.…”
Section: The Cis Argument In Briefmentioning
confidence: 99%