The bargaining literature suggests that management that perceives a strike settlement as advantageous to itself will be reinforced in resorting to strategies conducive to this particular settlement in the future. In this study management perceptions of advantageous settlements of strikes were predicted by the extent to which the struck plant was kept in operation, the extent to which a mediator was involved, frequency of strikes in the plant in the past, the duration of the strike, and its breadth. Data were collected from 51 chief management negotiators, each reporting on a strike in which more than 100 employees participated. Past frequency, duration, and a mediator's involvement turned out not to be significant as predictors. The management's perception of strike settlement as advantageous was found to be positively affected either by large breadth of the strike (i.e., more than 250 strikers) or by the management's success in keeping the plant in operation during the strike. The results indicate that management's power to resist strikes by operating the struck plant is a significant predictor, explaining 21% of the variance of the criterion. The findings cast doubt on the notion that unions are successful in identifying as strike targets employers who are vulnerable to the costs imposed by a strike. The implications of these findings for management spokespersons' future behavior in strike situations are discussed.Strikes maybe viewed as social psychological processes in which the characteristics of the employee-management interactions determine their outcomes (Nicholson & Kelly, 1980). A strike represents a highly competitive situation wherein at least two alternative solutions to a distributive conflict, one upheld by management and the other advocated by a union, vie for prominence, The bargaining literature suggests that under such circumstances, the occurrence of bargaining behaviors in which offers are matched by counteroffers is unlikely and in general concession-making behaviors are seriously disrupted (Magenau & Pruitt,