Strong, bold, and kind: self-control and cooperation in social dilemmas

Abstract

We develop a model relating self-control, risk preferences and conflict identification to cooperation patterns in social dilemmas. We subject our model to data from an experimental public goods game and a risk experiment, and we measure conflict identification and self-control.As predicted, we find a robust association between self-control and higher levels of cooperation, and the association is weaker for more risk-averse individuals. Free riders differ from other contributor types only in their tendency not to have identified a self-control conflict in the first place. Our model accounts for the data at least as well as do other models. JEL: C91, D03, H40

Social dilemmas: When self-control benefits cooperation

“…In a one-shot, linear public good game, Kocher et al (2012) tested a model of the relation between cooperation, self-control, risk-preferences, and the contributions of other players. Consistent with predictions from their model, cooperation are positively associated with the Rosenbaum (1980a) measure of trait self-control, and this association is moderated by risk-preferenceshigher risk aversion implies a weaker association.…”

“…They found that capacity for self-control was positively related to cooperation among participants who reported feeling conflicted during the contribution decision, but not among participants who reported no conflict. Our present paper seeks to test the causality of conflict identification in the public good, unresolved in Kocher et al (2012), by importing the experimental treatment from the dictator game by Martinsson et al (2010). We also included the conflict measure from Kocher et al (2012) to verify the treatment and to replicate the pattern obtained by them.…”

“…Following these ideas, Kocher et al (2012) theorized about, and found evidence of, a positive correlation between the capacity for self-control and cooperation among participants who reported feeling conflicted during the contribution decision-but not among participants who reported no conflict. In this paper, we directly test the causality of conflict identification in the public good game.…”

Giving is a Question of Time: Response Times and Contributions to a Real World Public Good

“…Heterogeneity in these preferences has been linked to a number of demographic attributes (Andreoni and Vesterlund, 2001;List, 2004), personality traits (Volk et al, 2012) as well as differences in beliefs (Fischbacher and Gächter, 2010). Recent experimental evidence (Piovesan and Wengström, 2009;Kocher et al, 2012;Rand et al, 2012;Duffy and Smith, 2012;Nielsen et al, 2014) suggests that the extent of cooperative behavior is additionally influenced by the type of cognitive system that potential contributors employ when considering their contribution choice. Two principal types of cognitive systems are distinguished by the reigning 'dual process' theories of the mind (Fudenberg and Levine, 2006;Loewenstein and O'Donoghue, 2007;Kahneman, 2011): System I, which arrives at decision through affective or intuitive processes, and System II, which generates decisions based on deliberative or calculated reasoning (Kahneman, 2003;Evans, 2003Evans, , 2008Loewenstein et al, 2008).…”

Depletion Influences Restraint, But Does It Influence Conflict Identification? Expanding on Osgood and Muraven (2015)

“…It is this joint resultego depletion affects pro-social behavior without affecting pro-social concerns-that represents the key contribution of their paper. We expand on the significance of their results by relating the pattern to recent theorizing about pro-social behavior and the two-stage model of self-control, which distinguishes between identifying self-control conflict and exercising restraint (Martinsson, Myrseth, & Wollbrant, 2012;Kocher, Martinsson, Myrseth, & Wollbrant, 2013;Martinsson, Myrseth, & Wollbrant, 2014).…”