2016
DOI: 10.3998/ergo.12405314.0003.005
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Structural Reflexivity and the Paradoxes of Self-Reference

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Cited by 54 publications
(71 citation statements)
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“… See Petersen (2000),Shapiro (2010) Zardini (2011), Beall and Murzi (2013 and Rosenblatt (2019) for non-contractive approaches;Weir (2005),Cobreros et al (2013) andRipley (2013) for non-transitive approaches;French (2016) andNicolai and Rossi (2018) for non-reflexive approaches and Da Ré (2020) for non-monotonic.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“… See Petersen (2000),Shapiro (2010) Zardini (2011), Beall and Murzi (2013 and Rosenblatt (2019) for non-contractive approaches;Weir (2005),Cobreros et al (2013) andRipley (2013) for non-transitive approaches;French (2016) andNicolai and Rossi (2018) for non-reflexive approaches and Da Ré (2020) for non-monotonic.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The answer, not surprisingly, points to the theories themselves, and in particular the extra-logical consequence relations of those theories. 21 Logic (-al consequence) is the universal closure relation on our true (non-empty) theories. But the construction (or, if you prefer, discovery) of such theories requires construction (or discovery) of extra-logical closure relations that are specific to the theory.…”
Section: Summary Evaluation Of the New Quinean Argumentmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In Greenough () it is argued that reflexivity ought to be restricted to sentences which are ‘supposition apt’, where this is understood in terms of their being warrants for the assertion or denial of conditionals with this sentence as an antecedent (see Read () for some arguments against Greenough's particular account). In French () an account of logical consequence in terms of norms of acceptance and rejection is given according to which the validity of structural reflexivity requires that we ought to either accept or reject the sentence in question, and in the case of paradoxical sentences we have good reason to do neither. Nonreflexive approaches to the paradoxes are also defended in Fjellstad ().…”
Section: Paradoxes Structural Rules and Dialoguesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…It appears prima facie irreproachable: what could possibly be more truth‐preserving than an inference from A to A itself? Reflexivity appears to be as innocent as it gets, as far as structural rules go (French, ). Barring dialethic considerations, there cannot be a single situation where A (the antecedent) is true while A (the consequent) is not true.…”
Section: Paradoxes Structural Rules and Dialoguesmentioning
confidence: 99%