Structuring cooperative relationships between organizations

Abstract

Y-Minnesota, U S A .Alliances and similar cooperative efforts are receiving increased attention in the strategic management literature. These relationships differ in signijicant ways from those governed by markets or hierarchies, and pose very different issues for researchers and managers. In this paper we address alternative forms of governance in cases where multiple organizations repeatedly cooperate. We explore their I characteristics and follow this with a discussion of criteria which we believe bear on the choice of governance: risk and reliance on trust. We offer propositions on relationships between these criteria and the choice of governance mechanisms. In the concluding section of the paper we explore the implications of our analysis for managers and scholars.Rapid changes in technology, the competitive environment, firm strategies and other pressures are prompting many firms to seek continuing cooperative relationships with other firms. These joint efforts are seen as expeditious ways to keep pace, especially when the firm is seeking unique and pioneering resources. But why are firms engaging in such repeated, contract-based transactions of idiosyncratic assets with the same organization when received theory (see, generally, Coase, 1937;Williamson, 1975Williamson, , 1985 predicts that they should be using hierarchical arrangements? Powell (1987) suggests that these firms are pursuing a diverse set of business objectives that require cooperation because they involve reciprocal dependencies. The contract-

Trust, control and knowledge transfer in small business networks

“…Interestingly, empirical research supports this consideration and emphasizes that its presence reduces agency problems (Ring and Van de Ven 1992), the costs of monitoring and control (Zand 1972), and the use of legalistic remedies (Sitkin and Roth 1993), and aids decision making in situations where information is scarce (Luhmann 2000). Trust is even found to have a positive effect in lending relationships (Moro et al 2014;Moro and Fink 2013) and generally contribute to build the ground for cooperation in multistakeholder networks (Roloff 2008); it is helpful in risky situations where the potential damage is greater than the advantage to be gained, and where the observation of past behaviour and information that is collected independently from the relationship play an important role (Fink and Kessler 2010).…”

Network Capitalism and the Role of Strategy, Contracts and Performance Expectations for Asia-Pacific Innovation Partnerships

“…Moreover, within market culture, exchange objects tend to be nonspecific, that is, the resources, products, services or knowledge that a partner contributes can also be found with other partners (Macneil, 1978;Williamson, 1985). Therefore, highly complex contractual agreements are not necessary since the competitive marketplace and standard contract regulations and corresponding laws provide efficient safeguards to the parties for mediating their transactions (Ring & Van de Ven, 1992). Besides, in a market culture, partners are equal and free, so that social relations among them are limited since developing them could incur costs or be irrelevant (Williamson, 1985).…”

Imersão Social Na Cadeia De Suprimentos E Seu Efeito Paradoxal No Desempenho Operacional

“…Mesmo não havendo obrigações sociais entre os atores econômicos, nesse tipo de troca, a governança da relação está baseada em regras explícitas e claras, necessárias para reduzir a incerteza, que são asseguradas por mecanismos de punição para comportamentos desviantes (North, 1990 (Coleman, 1988;Granovetter, 1985;Zaheer, McEvily, & Perrone, 1998), o que limita o oportunismo e a violação de expectativas coletivas (Rangan, 2000). O desenvolvimento da confiança e da solidariedade é visto, assim, como um efetivo mecanismo de controle social, eliminando a necessidade de controles hierárquicos diante do risco de perdas de reputação (Dyer & Singh, 1998;Gulati, 1995;Kuwabara & Sheldon, 2012;Lado et al, 2008;Ring & Van de Ven, 1992 A maioria dos autores postula que o controle social gerado pela imersão na rede substitui os mecanismos formais de governança (Gulati, 1998;Gulati, Nohria, & Zaheer, 2000;Jones, Hesterly, & Borgatti, 1997 …”