Structuring decision problems and the ‘bias heuristic’

Allocating time to future tasks: The effect of task segmentation on planning fallacy bias

“…However, although it appears that decomposition can have positive effects (e.g., increasing accuracy) in decision making, it is not a process that characterizes everyday decision making (Berkeley & Humphreys, 1982). Thus, the use of task segmentation and time allocation to subtasks might reduce planning fallacy bias, but, like decomposition, it is probably cognitively demanding and is not how individuals normally deal with their task time-allocation needs.…”

An information processing view of framing effects: The role of causal schemas in decision making

“…The apparent inconsistencies in decisions across the two frames may have derived from the fact that subjects and experimenters have different representations or understandings ofthe problem (Berkeley & Humphreys, 1982;Jungermann, 1986). Too much emphasis has been put on the errors that the subjects make, and too little on subjects' internal representations of the problems (Berkeley & Humphreys, 1982;Jungermann, 1986;Wagenaar, Keren, & Lichtenstein, 1988). In the present paper, we have presented an effort to address the question of problem representation and its effect on framing effects.…”

“…The central question asked in the present study is this: Is Tversky and Kahnemans (1981) result a demonstration of fundamental inconsistency in human judgment, or is it simply a manifestation of a disagreement between the experimenters' and the subjects' interpretations ofthe problem (Berkeley & Humphreys, 1982;Cohen, 1981;Hogarth, 1981;Jungermann, 1986)? The crux of the issue is the assumption that saving 200 lives is equivalent to losing 400 lives, and that losing 400 lives is equivalent to saving 200 lives.…”

“…Given the original form ofthe disease problem presented by Tversky and Kahneman (1981), people may not have understood the gain-loss equivalence relationship defined in Equations 1 and 2. Since no circumstances were described in the original problem that would match the schema of such an equivalence relationship, people may have constructed a mental representation regarding the consequence of the choice differently than the experimenters had intended (Berkeley & Humphreys, 1982;Einhorn & Hogarth, 1981;Jungermann, 1986).…”

Context Proceduralization in Decision Making

“…This is why so frequent are the beliefs of plot and/or purposeful action of powerful leaders when an accident or a catastrophe occurs (see [15, p. 83]; [20, p. 164]). In some sense, magic thought and illusory correlations [8] are frequent, this is a sign of a perverse proceduralization: people proceduralize without any evidence because they need these links to organize the "small world" structuring the decision at hand [3].…”