An influential theoretical perspective differentiates in humans an explicit, rule-based system of category learning from an implicit system that slowly associates different regions of perceptual space with different response outputs. This perspective was extended for the first time to the category learning of nonhuman primates. Humans and macaques learned categories composed of sine-wave gratings that varied across trials in bar width and bar orientation. The categories had either a singledimensional, rule-based solution or a two-dimensional, information-integration solution. Humans strongly dimensionalized the stimuli and learned the rule-based task far more quickly. Six macaques showed the same performance advantage in the rule-based task. In humans, rule-based category learning is linked to explicit cognition, consciousness, and to declarative reports about the contents of cognition. The present results demonstrate an empirical continuity between human and nonhuman primate cognition, suggesting that nonhuman primates may have some structural components of humans' capacity for explicit cognition.Keywords category learning; implicit/explicit cognition; primate cognition; comparative cognition; rhesus monkeys Learning and using categories is a basic cognitive function for humans and animals. Consequently, categorization is a focus of research involving humans (Ashby & Maddox, 2005;Brooks, 1978;Murphy, 2003; Nosofsky, 1987;Rosch & Mervis, 1975; Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to J. David Smith, 346 Park Hall, SUNY Buffalo, Buffalo, NY 14260 psysmith@buffalo.edu. Publisher's Disclaimer: The following manuscript is the final accepted manuscript. It has not been subjected to the final copyediting, fact-checking, and proofreading required for formal publication. It is not the definitive, publisher-authenticated version. The American Psychological Association and its Council of Editors disclaim any responsibility or liabilities for errors or omissions of this manuscript version, any version derived from this manuscript by NIH, or other third parties. The published version is available at www.apa.org/pubs/journals/xan.
NIH Public AccessAuthor Manuscript J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2011 January 1.
NIH-PA Author ManuscriptNIH-PA Author Manuscript NIH-PA Author Manuscript 1998) and animals (Cerella, 1979;Herrnstein, Loveland, & Cable, 1976;Jitsumori, 1994;Lea & Ryan, 1990;Smith, Redford, & Haas, 2008;Vauclair, 2002;Wasserman, Kiedinger, & Bhatt, 1988).Early categorization theories assumed that organisms apply a single category-learning system to all category problems. Different descriptions were offered for this system (e.g., Medin & Schaffer, 1978;Reed, 1972). In hindsight, it was predictable that categorization would not be so simple and unitary. Categorization is an important enough capacity that it might deserve (and receive) distributed and varied expression in cognition. Fortunately, many researchers transcended the "single system" claim a...